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Few statements of Massachusetts law have been as con­
founding and as frequently repeated as this: liability under the im­
plied warranty of merchantability is congruent in nearly all respects 
with strict products liability in tort.1  Coming to terms with what 
strict products liability2 really means has been the central issue 
throughout the modern era of Massachusetts products liability law.3 
Massachusetts courts have struggled to articulate workable stan­
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. 
1. Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968-69 (Mass. 1978). 
2. As discussed in Part I of this Article, there is, strictly speaking, “no strict liabil­
ity in tort” in Massachusetts because the implied warranty of merchantability, in MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 106, §§ 2-314-318 (2008), has been thought to do essentially the same 
duty.  Swartz v. Gen. Motors Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61, 62-64 (Mass. 1978). This Article will 
take note of the limited circumstances in which the theoretical distinction between the 
implied warranty of merchantability and strict liability in tort has made a difference, but 
it will refer to “strict liability” as the concept which purports to underlie the implied 
warranty of merchantability. 
3. See David R. Geiger & Stephanie Copp Martinez, Design and Warning Defect 
Claims Under Massachusetts Product Liability Law: Completing the Merger of Negli­
gence and Warranty, 43 BOSTON B. J. 12, 12-13 (1999).  The modern era of Massachu­
setts products liability law will be referred to in this Article as the period beginning in 
1971 when MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, §§ 2-314-318, was originally amended to create a 
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dards that advance consumer protection.4  In 2010, forty-five years 
after section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts heralded a 
new enlightened era of products liability law, that process is still not 
complete.  The evolution of modern Massachusetts products liabil­
ity law, which began with the notion that the traditional negligence 
cause of action in tort was inadequate in a complex economy with 
sophisticated consumer products, has shown that negligence con­
cepts still animate, and should animate, most products liability 
cases.  The resilience of negligence theory in Massachusetts law is 
owed, in part, to its effectiveness in advancing worthy public policy 
goals.5  But this resilience also stems from unfortunate choices Mas­
sachusetts courts have made in constructing implied warranty of 
merchantability doctrine.  Warranty liability doctrine purports to be 
a robust mechanism for holding manufacturers and sellers responsi­
ble for their defective products.6  In reality, Massachusetts courts 
have made the implied warranty of merchantability into a cause of 
action that over-promises and under-delivers.  A frank acknowledg­
ment of that fact would be a significant benefit to the courts, law­
yers, consumers, manufacturers, and product sellers. 
This Article will contend that “strict liability,” at least as the 
concept has been used in Massachusetts products liability law, has 
no independent, widely-understood meaning.  It has served mainly 
as a rhetorical device to express commendable aspirations about 
consumer protection and for progressive social policy in general.  It 
has, on the other hand, failed to serve as a useful principle for de­
ciding actual cases.  Strict liability,7 understood in its most basic 
sense as liability without fault, cannot be reconciled with how Mas­
sachusetts courts have decided most products liability cases in the 
modern era, a truth that the Supreme Judicial Court has only re­
cently and fitfully begun to acknowledge.8  That is not to say that 
the preference for the strict liability label has been anything less 
4. Geiger & Martinez, supra note 3, at 13. R 
5. See Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922 (Mass. 1998) (re­
jecting strict liability “hindsight approach” in favor of negligence-style standard in fail­
ure to warn cases by noting “[t]he goal of the law is to induce conduct that is capable of 
being performed”). 
6. See Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Mass. 
1983) (warranty liability imposes on product sellers “duty . . . unknown in the law of 
negligence” requiring sellers to “stand behind their goods”). 
7. See Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., 323 N.E.2d 876, 877 (Mass. 
1975) (strict liability is “absolute liability without fault”). 
8. Compare Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862, 865 (Mass. 2001) (“[W]e [have] 
abandoned the strict liability approach to implied warranties of merchantability . . . .”), 
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than hugely influential during the modern era. The meaning of 
strict liability language has to be understood within the factual cir­
cumstances of each decision in which it has been invoked.  Scholars 
and products liability practitioners should understand that refer­
ences to strict liability and its supposed counterpoint, negligence, by 
Massachusetts courts are really questions, rather than explanations. 
A keen observer will use these references to ask, “what does the 
court really mean by strict liability (or negligence) here?” This Ar­
ticle will attempt to be precise about the meaning behind these la­
bels wherever they are used. 
Part I of this Article will describe the beginnings of the modern 
era by analyzing the still seminal decisions from the mid-to-late 
1970s.  In doing so, it will first place the new strict liability regime in 
context by sketching the state of the law before the amendments to 
the implied warranty of merchantability were passed between 1971 
and 1974.9  This background will illuminate the perceived shortcom­
ings in Massachusetts products liability doctrine, and it will define 
the problems the makers of this new products liability doctrine saw 
as they began to interpret the new warranty cause of action. This 
Article will argue that these early cases confronted some of the 
most difficult issues in products liability law, broke important 
ground, and arrived at sound decisions which have stood the test of 
time. 
Part II of this Article will discuss a period during the 1980s and 
1990s during which Massachusetts courts, enamored with the idea 
of strict liability, went off course by producing decisions that were 
logically inconsistent with each other and with precedent. These 
cases imposed duties on manufacturers and sellers that could not be 
carried out in the real world. To counterbalance these onerous du­
ties, the Supreme Judicial Court created the unreasonable use doc-
trine,10 which has hampered the ability of injured plaintiffs to 
recover damages to the point where traditional negligence claims 
have often been more fruitful than implied warranty claims.  In 
short, modern products liability law in Massachusetts became a 
muddle that did not promote the public policies it ostensibly sup­
ported.  It was during this period that federal courts in Massachu­
setts diverged from the state courts they were supposedly following, 
ity is ‘fully as comprehensive as the strict liability theory of recovery . . . .’” (quoting 
Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968 (Mass. 1978)). 
9. See Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61, 63-64 (Mass. 1978) 
(describing 1971 and 1974 amendments). 
10. Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1040-41. 
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to the point that they developed a separate and more enlightened 
doctrine.  All of this produced a period of painful confusion, a con­
dition that has not altogether dissipated, even today. 
Part III treats the most recent part of the modern era, from the 
Supreme Judicial Court’s 1998 decision in Vassallo v. Baxter Health­
care Corp.11 to the present, in which Massachusetts courts have 
backtracked from some of the rhetorical flourishes of the “mud­
dled” period and have begun to define strict liability in more logi­
cal, practical terms. Vassallo, which sensibly decided that 
manufacturers and sellers had no duty to warn of dangers that ex­
perts could not have known about, was a much-needed prick to the 
strict liability balloon, but it remains a partial step toward a func­
tional, policy-driven methodology for deciding products liability 
cases.12  After Vassallo, Massachusetts products liability law is still 
saddled with wooden rules that unnaturally limit and enlarge liabil­
ity.13  The unreasonable use defense endures with its capacity to 
confuse juries and to protect defendants who could have prevented 
serious injuries with reasonable accident avoidance measures.14 
Most surprisingly, key issues remain unclear due to contradictory 
precedent, despite ample opportunity to clarify them.15 
This Article will argue that Massachusetts products liability law 
should worry less about parsing the concepts of “negligence” and 
“strict liability” and focus more on the fact that current law includes 
both fault-based and non-fault-based standards. This Article will 
further argue that the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Lia­
bility, with its agnosticism about doctrinal labels,16 provides a rubric 
that is largely consistent with the core concepts of Massachusetts 
products liability law, minus some of its less enlightened elements, 
and one which would fill in the gaps of the current jurisprudence. 
Adopting the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability as a 
guide to interpreting the implied warranty of merchantability would 
provide benefits to deserving litigants on both sides and would bet­
ter serve the social policies of consumer protection, consumer 
choice, and compensation to injured persons. 
11. Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998). 
12. Id. at 923. 
13. See infra section III. 
14. See infra section III.C. 
15. See infra section III. 
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a (1998). 
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I. SKETCHING OUT THE MODERN DOCTRINE (1975-1978) 
The Massachusetts judges who decided the first products liabil­
ity cases after the implied warranty of merchantability was 
amended between 1971 and 1974 began their construction of the 
strict liability doctrine with an understanding of negligence and 
warranty cases that stretched back several decades.17  These cases 
exposed deficiencies in the injured plaintiff’s right to recovery that 
the statutory amendments were clearly designed to address.18  Only 
by understanding the state of the law prior to 1971 is it possible to 
appreciate how the implied warranty of merchantability was 
shaped, and how it should have been shaped. 
A.	 The Pre-Modern Era and the Problems the New Implied 
Warranty Cause of Action Was Trying to Solve 
1. Rise and Fall of the Privity Rule in Negligence Actions 
In the early twentieth century, persons injured by consumer or 
industrial products were confronted at the outset with the privity 
requirement, which demanded that a plaintiff show a contractual 
relationship with the defendant.19  While this understandably ap­
plied to contractual remedies such as the breach of an express war­
ranty, it had been applied to the tort doctrine of negligence as a 
bulwark to the unwarranted expansion of liability to an unlimited 
class of plaintiffs.20  Stemming from the 1842 English case of 
Winterbottom v. Wright,21 this rule spread throughout the United 
States, including Massachusetts.22  Thus, in the 1866 case of David-
son v. Nichols, a plaintiff, having bought a potion in a bottle from a 
retailer, was barred from recovering in negligence from the whole­
17. In doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873, 879 (Mass. 1975), the first signifi­
cant products liability case to be decided after the 1971 and 1974 amendments, the court 
cited and relied upon numerous pre-modern cases, indicating that it was well aware of 
the pre-modern case law. 
18. See infra section I.A. 
19. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 698-700 (Mass. 1946) (recounting 
history of privity rule). 
20. See Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 80 N.E. 482, 482-83 (Mass. 1907). The 
court noted that: 
If such an extended liability attached where no privity of contract exists it 
would include all persons however remote who had been damaged either in 
person or property by his carelessness, and manufacturers as a class would be 
exposed to such far-reaching consequences as to seriously embarrass the gen­
eral prosecution of mercantile business. 
Id. 
21. Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch.). 
22. Carter, 64 N.E.2d at 698. 
6 
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sale druggist who had sold the potion to the retailer.23  The Su­
preme Judicial Court came to this result assuming that the 
wholesale druggist had mistakenly placed the wrong mixture in the 
bottle through “negligence and want of skill,” that the bottle had 
been sealed prior to its delivery to the retailer, and that the con­
sumer had suffered severe injuries when the concoction had ex­
ploded.24 Davidson held that the wholesale druggist owed no duty 
to the plaintiff simply because he owed no duty in contract.25 
Harsh results such as these began a prompt search for excep­
tions to the privity rule.26  Soon carved out from the operation of 
the privity rule were inherently dangerous products, which included 
explosives such as gunpowder and nitroglycerine, as well as poison­
ous drugs.27  Also finding refuge in this exception was a man apply­
ing stain to a room who struck a match and ignited the fumes that 
had been released from the stain.28  Massachusetts courts thus dis­
tinguished “inherently dangerous” or “intrinsically harmful” prod­
ucts from those that are ordinarily harmless, unless they contain 
some defect.29  This exception grew to include many consumer 
products, including combs placed in a woman’s hair to produce a 
wave hairstyle.30  The combs themselves could not cause injury, but 
when placed in the hair and subjected to hot air from an electric 
dryer, they released a flammable chemical.31  The combs caught fire 
and caused burns to a woman’s head.32 Farley v. Edward E. Tower 
& Co. found the combs to be inherently dangerous, reasoning that 
“the dangerous quality of an article is none the less inherent be­
cause it is brought into action by some external force.”33 
Carter v. Yardley & Co. put an end to these creative circum­
ventions of the privity rule by abolishing it in 1946.34  By that time, 
the privity rule had been dead for thirty years in New York, follow­
23. Davidson v. Nichols, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 514, 516-20 (1866). 
24. Id. at 516. 
25. Id. at 518-19. 
26. See Carter, 64 N.E.2d at 698. 
27. See Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 80 N.E. 482, 482-83 (Mass. 1907). 
28. Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 108 N.E. 474, 491-92 (Mass. 1915). 
29. Id. at 491; see Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 171 N.E. 639, 641 (Mass. 
1930) (“Danger is inherent when it is due to the nature of an article and not to a defect 
in an article naturally harmless . . . .”). 
30. Farley, 171 N.E. at 640. 
31. Id. at 640-41. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 641. 
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ing Justice Cardozo’s opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., in 
which he famously declared that: 
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and 
limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, 
grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source 
of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in 
the law.35 
By the time Carter was decided, there was no need for the 
boldness or eloquence of Justice Cardozo because the majority of 
jurisdictions had already abandoned the privity rule.36  It was 
enough to observe that the distinctions from the “inherently dan­
gerous” exception lacked any “rational basis.”37 
2.	 Pre-Modern Cases Limited to Hidden Dangers with 
Wholly Innocent Victims 
Having torn down the artificial privity barrier for negligence 
actions, but maintaining it for express warranty or implied warranty 
claims,38 the Supreme Judicial Court was still faced with defining 
the duties owed by product manufacturers and sellers to the con­
sumer.  The pre-modern cases in Massachusetts tended to stem 
from situations where hidden dangers in the product had caused 
injury to unsuspecting users.39  Products liability suits fell into two 
general categories: (1) hidden manufacturing defects, and (2) fail­
ure to warn of hidden, inherent dangers in the product.40  Today, 
this represents only a portion of the modern products liability 
docket.41  It appears that plaintiffs’ lawyers did not even conceive of 
trying to hold manufacturers and sellers responsible for design 
choices that created obvious but avoidable dangers.42  Likewise, 
35.	 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Corp., 111 N.E.1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). 
36.	 Carter, 64 N.E.2d at 700. 
37.	 Id. at 698-99. 
38.	 Id. at 695 n.2. 
39.	 See infra sections I.A.3 and I.A.4. 
40.	 See infra sections I.A.3 and I.A.4. 
41. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in 
Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 483-84 
(1990) (describing how products liability litigation has come to include design defect 
claims and how significant design issues have become in products liability law). 
42. Of course, the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, not 
abolished until 1969 and 1973, respectively, were powerful deterrents to all but wholly 
innocent plaintiffs. See Riley v. Davison Constr. Co., 409 N.E.2d 1279, 1282-84 (Mass. 
1980) (describing defenses and their histories).  On the other hand, published decisions 
relating to products liability and the assumption of the risk defense are virtually non­
 
8 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE101.txt unknown Seq: 8 27-SEP-11 9:54 
WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
Massachusetts courts were not called upon to grapple with injuries 
stemming from uses of the product that departed from the uses that 
the manufacturer had intended.  In warning cases, plaintiffs alleged 
a complete lack of warning, rather than complaining that the warn­
ing was inadequate, incomplete, or failed to capture the user’s 
attention.43 
It should be quickly noted that the foregoing observation 
about these two categories of products liability cases suggests a de­
gree of analytical rigor that Massachusetts courts did not them­
selves apply.  Similarly, products liability jurisprudence in most 
states remained focused on the issues surrounding manufacturing 
defects, and to some extent, warning claims.44  Design claims had 
not been, in a sense, invented yet.45  William Prosser, in his influen­
tial 1960 article The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), spoke of holding sellers responsible for manufacturing 
defects, even as he made the argument for strict liability in almost 
revolutionary terms.46 
In 1965, when the American Law Institute adopted section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a provision also au­
thored by Prosser, it focused on manufacturing defects.47  “Section 
402A had little to say about liability for design defects or for prod­
ucts sold with inadequate warnings.  In the early 1960s, these areas 
of litigation were in their infancy.”48 
3. Pre-Modern Warning Cases 
The presence of a hidden danger and the unquestioned exer­
cise of due care by the plaintiff, were common to the pre-modern 
Massachusetts cases that recognized liability, or at least potential 
liability, on the part of a manufacturer or seller.  In a typical pre­
existent in Massachusetts during the pre-modern era. This shows that plaintiffs’ lawyers 
were not bringing products liability cases that tested the limits of the defense. 
43. Compare Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 171 N.E. 639, 641-42 (Mass. 
1930), with MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm.Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70-71 (Mass. 1985). 
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a (1998) (describing 
how products liability began with manufacturing defects and extended to design and 
most warning claims only in the 1960s and 1970s). 
45. See id. 
46. See William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).  Liability for hidden manufacturing defects has a 
history dating back to medieval English law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF  TORTS 
§ 402A cmt. b (1965) (noting high degree of responsibility for food products dating 
back to 1266). 
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. introductory cmt. 
48. Id. 
9 
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modern warning case, the Supreme Judicial Court could confidently 
say that: 
[I]t is settled that a person who sells an article, which he knows is 
inherently dangerous to human life, limb or health, to another 
person, who has no knowledge of its true character, and fails to 
give notice thereof to the purchaser, is liable in damages to a 
third person who, while in the exercise of due care, is injured by a 
use of it which should have been contemplated by the seller.49 
In the 1961 case of Mealey v. Super Curline Hair Wave Corp., 
the plaintiff was a nine year old girl who went to a hair salon where 
a lotion was applied to her hair.50  The lotion was to be used with a 
heating pad, and the combination of the two produced an ammonia 
gas that caused burns to the child’s scalp.51  Free of the privity re­
quirement and the need to evade it, Mealey was presented with the 
traditional negligence inquiries of whether the injury was foresee­
able and whether the manufacturer had breached its duty of due 
care by failing to give notice of the danger.52 Mealey had no 
trouble in affirming a judgment for the plaintiff where the manufac­
turer’s instructions had directed the use of a heating pad with the 
lotion and had said nothing about the danger of burns.53 
One notable exception to the fairly straightforward warning 
cases like Mealey was the Supreme Judicial Court’s 1961 decision in 
Ricciutti v. Sylvania Electric Products Inc.,54 which proved to be a 
forerunner to the toxic tort litigation of the modern era.  In warning 
cases where the manufacturer had simply neglected to warn of a 
hidden danger the plaintiff had no way of suspecting, the basic duty 
to warn was unquestioned.55  In Ricciutti, the manufacturer dis­
claimed such a duty where the plaintiff had contracted berylliosis 
from having been exposed to beryllium while working with the de­
fendant’s florescent tubes some years earlier.56  The manufacturer 
sought to show that it did not know about the risk of disease at the 
time it sold the products which allegedly harmed the plaintiff.57 
49. Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 171 N.E. 639, 640 (Mass. 1930). 
50. Mealy v. Super Curline Hair Wave Corp., 173 N.E.2d 84, 85-86 (Mass. 1961). 
51. Id. at 86. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Ricciutti v. Sylvania Elec. Prod. Inc., 178 N.E.2d 857, 860-62 (Mass. 1961). 
55. See Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 171 N.E. 639, 642 (Mass. 1930) (stating 
that while knowledge of risk is presumed, it is clear that manufacturer, in fact, did know 
of the risk). 
56. Ricciutti, 178 N.E.2d at 860-62. 
57. Id. 
10 
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The trial court sustained the manufacturer’s objection to a jury in­
struction which would have said that “[e]very manufacturer is pre­
sumed to know the nature and quality of his products.”58  On 
appeal, Ricciutti held that the plaintiff was required to prove that 
the defendant “knew or through the exercise of reasonable care 
should have known that his product was dangerous.”59  Prior Mas­
sachusetts cases had lent support to the presumption of knowledge 
advocated by the plaintiff.60  In fact, the proposed jury instruction 
had been a familiar incantation in warning cases for decades. 
Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co. had explicitly held that “[p]roof 
. . . of actual knowledge is not required where the article is so made 
up as to be inherently harmful.”61  In the earlier cases, the courts 
were dealing with simpler products, and they had not been con­
fronted with products involving a complex disease process that took 
many years to manifest itself.62 
Ricciutti eschewed the presumption of knowledge that Massa­
chusetts courts had blithely applied in cases where the manufac­
turer’s lack of knowledge about the dangers posed by its products 
was not seriously presented.  This presumption would be resur­
rected in the 1980s in Massachusetts and elsewhere with a “hind­
sight” test, where in the name of strict liability, the manufacturer 
and seller of a product would be presumed to know of dangers dis­
covered after the sale of the product.63  The Supreme Judicial Court 
would later repudiate precedent, as it did in Ricciutti, to again re­
quire the plaintiff to prove that the defendant knew or should have 
known of the dangerous quality of the product.64 
4. Pre-Modern Manufacturing Defect Cases 
Manufacturing defect cases during the pre-modern era in­
volved hidden imperfections that caused injuries when the products 
were used as the manufacturer intended.65  Plaintiffs bringing negli­
gence actions faced practical problems of proving how the manufac­
turer’s negligence in the production or quality control process had 
58. Id. at 861. 
59. Id. 
60. See id. at 861-62 (citing cases advanced by plaintiff). 
61. Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 108 N.E. 474, 491 (Mass. 1915). 
62. See, e.g., Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 694-95 (perfume caused 
immediate burns to skin). 
63. See infra Part II.B. 
64. See infra Part III.A. 
65. See Evangelio v. Metro. Bottling Co., 158 N.E.2d 342, 344-46 (Mass. 1959) 
(canvassing manufacturing defect cases involving bottles and other products). 
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allowed a defective product to enter the marketplace.66  In these 
cases, the concept of “defect” had a straightforward meaning since 
the product, such as a soda bottle containing a crack, departed from 
the intended design.  When the product, like a shattering soda bot­
tle,67 would fail suddenly, often in catastrophic fashion, the plaintiff 
would be left with little evidence of what exactly the imperfection 
was, and little ability to trace the defect back to the specific act of 
negligence that had been visited upon one of a multitude of seem­
ingly identical products.68 
In the 1959 case of Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., the 
Supreme Judicial Court was presented with a claim by a woman 
who was injured when a soda bottle exploded in her hand.69  At 
trial, the plaintiff sued the bottler in negligence but presented no 
evidence of a specific act of negligence on the part of the bottler.70 
Instead, she relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to draw an 
inference of negligence because such an unusual event would not 
have happened unless the defendant had been negligent.71  Because 
her evidence consisted of broken pieces of glass, the plaintiff could 
not even say whether the bottle had contained an imperfection in 
the glass, had been given an excessive amount of carbonation, or 
had been mishandled.72 Evangelio allowed recovery, finding as a 
matter of common knowledge that an exploding bottle permitted 
an inference of negligence, where it was clear that the bottle had 
not been mishandled since it had left the hands of the bottler.73  In 
doing so, it overruled prior cases which held that the plaintiff must 
show a specific act of negligence.74 
The Supreme Judicial Court allowed the res ipsa loquitor infer­
ence of negligence in a 1963 case involving a manufacturing defect 
66. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 438-39 (Cal. 
1944) (res ipsa loquitur inference of negligence permitted where it was unclear even in 
hindsight what kind of manufacturing defect caused product to fail); Evangelio, 158 
N.E.2d at 344-46. 
67. Evangelio, 158 N.E.2d at 343-44. 
68. See id. at 344-46; Escola, 150 P.2d at 438-39; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998) (often manufacturing defects are caused by de­
fendant’s negligence but plaintiff has trouble proving it). 
69. Evangelio, 158 N.E.2d at 342-44. 
70. Id. at 344. 
71. Id. at 344-45. 
72. Id. at 346-47 (acknowledging multiple possible causes of product failure). 
73. Id. at 347. 
74. Id. (overruling Howard v. Lowell Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 78 N.E.2d 7 (Mass. 
1948)). 
12 
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in an automobile’s transmission.75  The plaintiff was able, through 
expert testimony, to identify the problem in the transmission.76  The 
inference that the problem stemmed from negligence in the manu­
facture of the car was appropriate because the vehicle had not left 
the car dealer’s lot at the time of the accident.77 
The limits of negligence theory, res ipsa loquitur, and the im­
plied warranty of merchantability remedy were exposed in a 1970 
case that played a significant role in bringing about the amend­
ments to section 2-314 through 2-31878 between 1971 and 1974.  In 
Necktas v. General Motors Corp.,79 a man had purchased a new 
General Motors (GM) automobile from a dealer, and he drove it 
about 500 miles in the next fifteen days before he was involved in a 
fatal accident caused by a defective power steering unit.80  The 
man’s estate sued GM and the dealer for negligence and breach of 
the implied warranty of merchantability.81 Necktas held that there 
was sufficient evidence that there had been a defect in the power 
steering unit at the time of sale and that this constituted a breach of 
warranty.82  The plaintiff could not recover against GM on the war­
ranty claim due to lack of privity, but it could recover from the 
dealer on the warranty claim because the dealer had sold the car 
directly to the decedent.83  However, the plaintiff could not, based 
on the breach of warranty, recover damages due to the man’s death, 
since by statute, such a remedy existed only if there had been either 
“negligence or . . . a wilful, wanton or reckless act causing death.”84 
Meanwhile, the court found that the plaintiff had presented insuffi­
cient evidence of negligence on the part of GM or the dealer be­
cause the evidence about the nature of the defect was not specific 
enough.85 
Necktas showed how the combination of negligence theory and 
the implied warranty of merchantability could be inadequate in the 
pre-modern era to provide an avenue for compensation in a deserv­
ing case.  The automobile contained a dangerous flaw at the time of 
75. LeBlanc v. Ford Motor Co., 191 N.E.2d 301, 304-05 (Mass. 1963). 
76. Id. at 304. 
77. Id. at 305. 
78. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, §§ 2-314 to -318 (2008). 
79. Necktas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 259 N.E.2d 234, 235 (Mass. 1970). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 235-36. 
82. Id. at 236. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 235. 
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sale which was hidden to the consumer.86  The product did not per­
form as it was intended to perform, and the resulting injury was 
fatal.87  The court did not indulge in the res ipsa loquitor inference 
of negligence where the product was more complex than an explod­
ing soda bottle, and “common knowledge”88 provided little in the 
way of explanation for the accident.89  The court was satisfied that 
the plaintiff had proven a defect, but the plaintiff had not provided 
specific evidence about acts of negligence giving rise to that defect 
on the part of GM or the dealer.90  The inability to prove negli­
gence then precluded recovery for the man’s death.91  GM, the ob­
vious culprit for the faulty power steering unit, escaped liability 
altogether.92  These anomalies paved the way for passage of the 
new implied warranty of merchantability statute. 
B. Section 402A and the Strict Liability Wave 
Outside of Massachusetts, momentum had been building for an 
explicit recognition of strict liability in tort for manufacturing de­
fects.  A number of jurisdictions recognized strict liability for food 
products in the early twentieth century, and the rule spread to the 
majority of jurisdictions and to a number of other products by the 
1950s.93  Numerous legal scholars had been writing during the 1950s 
about the inadequacies of warranty law and the need to expand 
strict liability beyond food products.94  In 1960, New Jersey adopted 
a general theory of strict liability in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mo­
tors, Inc., through the implied warranty of merchantability by strip­
ping away the privity requirement and by invalidating the 
manufacturer’s disclaimers, which prevented recovery for personal 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Evangelio v. Metro. Bottling Co., 158 N.E.2d 342, 346 (Mass. 1959). 
89. Necktas, 259 N.E.2d at 235-38 (holding evidence of negligence insufficient in 
face of dissent that argued that jury could make inference negligence based on common 
knowledge). 
90. Id. at 236. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Prosser, supra note 46, at 1106-14. R 
94. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles From the Yale Law Journal, 100 
YALE L.J. 1449, 1470 (1991) (Prosser’s Assault Upon the Citadel was one of many arti­
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injury.95  In 1962, California became the first jurisdiction to hold 
that strict liability in tort would apply to all products.96 
All of this set the stage for the American Law Institute to pub­
lish Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A in 1965. Although Pros­
ser, the Restatement’s author, had predicted that adoption of strict 
liability across the United States could take fifty years, section 
402A “spread like wildfire” to virtually every jurisdiction from the 
mid-1960s to the mid-1980s.97  Some jurisdictions almost immedi­
ately followed California’s lead in adopting section 402A and strict 
liability in tort.98  One 1966 opinion exclaimed that “[i]t has been 
said that” [section 402A] was “one of the most spectacular develop­
ments of tort law in this century.”99  Surely, it is also fairly said that 
section 402A has been the most influential provision of any Re­
statement of the Law.100 
C.	 1971-1974 Amendments to the Implied Warranty of 
Merchantability 
Against the backdrop of clear inadequacies in Massachusetts 
negligence and warranty law illuminated by Necktas, and a power­
ful movement in academia and in the courts advocating a strict lia­
bility regime for defective products, it was all but inevitable that 
Massachusetts would revamp its products liability law.  Massachu­
setts chose to make these changes legislatively by amending its ver­
sion of the Uniform Commercial Code’s implied warranty of 
merchantability.101 
The most significant change was the elimination of the privity 
requirement, a legislative action that was the equivalent of New 
95.	 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 99-102 (N.J. 1960). 
96. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901-02 (Cal. 1963); 
Dominick Vetri, Order out of Chaos: Products Liability Design-Defect Law, 43 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 1373, 1381 (2009). 
97. David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG. 955, 
977 (2007); see Prosser, supra note 46, at 1138. R 
98. See William A. Worthington, The “Citadel” Revisited: Strict Tort Liability and 
the Policy of Law, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 227, 242 n.79 (1995) (describing “race” to adopt 
section 402A and citing cases). 
99.	 Cochran v. Brooke, 409 P.2d 904, 906 (Or. 1966) (en banc) (citation omitted). 
100. Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Prod­
ucts Liability, 60 MO. L. REV. 1, 12 (1995) (noting that section 402A has been cited in 
over three thousand judicial opinions). 
101. See Swartz v. Gen. Motors Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Mass. 1978) (describing 
amendments to the implied warranty of merchantability to make it equivalent to section 
402A); Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 1215, 1216-18 (Mass. 1977) (discussing 
history of applicable Massachusetts legislative amendments). 
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Jersey’s Henningsen decision.102  The legislature also amended the 
wrongful death statute to allow for recovery in warranty actions.103 
Together, these two amendments had the effect of fixing the injus­
tices identified in Necktas.104 The amendments also extended im­
plied warranty protection beyond sales transactions to commercial 
leases.105  The statute of limitations period was changed to three 
years, which only begins to run upon the occurrence of the injury or 
damage sustained by the plaintiff, rather than upon the sale of the 
product.106  The old rule allowed claims to be extinguished before 
the plaintiff was injured and could have sued.107  The legislature 
gave teeth to these changes by forbidding, and in some cases, limit­
ing the extent to which these protections could be disclaimed or 
excluded by contract.108 
Together, these various legislative enactments “jettisoned 
many of the doctrinal encumbrances of the law of sales and what 
remains is a very different theory of recovery from that traditionally 
associated with the sale of goods.”109  As important as these amend­
ments were, they were limited to removing what may be termed 
“wooden rules” that automatically and somewhat arbitrarily fore­
closed recovery.  In short, they were directed to the more limited 
set of issues that Massachusetts courts had grappled with during the 
pre-modern era.  The amendments addressed who could sue, who 
could be sued, and what kinds of products would be subject to the 
implied warranty of merchantability.110  They established some 
102. See Hoffman, 364 N.E.2d at 1216 (discussing the elimination of privity re­
quirement); supra section I.B. 
103. See Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 n.4 (Mass. 1978). 
104. See id. (noting the result in Necktas and the amendment to the wrongful 
death statute); Swartz, 378 N.E.2d at 63 (noting the result in Necktas and the elimina­
tion of the privity requirement). 
105. See Swartz, 378 N.E.2d at 63 (amended section 2-318 applies to commercial 
leases). 
106. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (2008). 
107. See Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 374 N.E.2d 582, 584 (Mass. 1978) 
(describing the effect of the old statute of limitations for implied warranty actions).  In 
Cannon, the plaintiff brought his action shortly before the statute was amended, two 
years after he was injured and nine years after the sale and manufacture of the product. 
Id. at 583.  The three year statute of limitations was held not to bar the negligence claim 
because it accrued at the time of the injury. Id. at 584. The warranty claim, however, 
was barred because the plaintiff could not take advantage of the amended section 2-318 
and its new accrual rule. Id. at 584 n.3. 
108. See ch. 106, § 2-316A. 
109. Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969. 
110. See ch. 106, § 2-318 (defining classes of plaintiffs and defendants); ch. 106, 
§ 2-316(5) (excluding certain products from implied warranty of merchantability); see 
16 
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helpful procedural rules for regulating the relationship between 
manufacturer, seller, and consumer, and they expanded the kinds of 
damages that could be sought.111  These basic issues were also at 
the heart of the strict liability movement in other states.112  Prosser, 
the acolyte of strict liability, concentrated his energies on the aboli­
tion of privity and the extension of strict liability from foods to 
other products.113  Tellingly, section 402A finds it necessary to ad­
dress the kinds of products subject to the new rule, and then to list a 
number of them, product by product.114 
Left undone by the Massachusetts legislative amendments and 
by section 402A was the more nuanced work of elaborating on the 
duties owed by manufacturers and sellers.  Duties relating to the 
design of products were not addressed at all in either the Massachu­
setts laws or in section 402A.  These omissions stem from the fact 
that strict products liability, in its infancy, was concerned with man­
ufacturing defect cases such as Necktas, or cases involving explod­
ing bottles.115  The defectiveness of the product in these situations 
was without question.116 
Thus when the Supreme Judicial Court formulated its declara­
tion that “[t]he Legislature has made the Massachusetts law of war­
ranty congruent in nearly all respects with the principles expressed 
also Hoffman v. Howmedica, 364 N.E.2d 1215, 1216-18 (Mass. 1977) (discussing 
amendments). 
111. Ch. 106, §§ 2-316 to -316A (regulating extent to which seller may disclaim 
warranties); ch. 106, § 2-318 (establishing statute of limitations and eliminating notice 
defense); see also Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969 n.4 (noting amendment of statute to allow for 
wrongful death for a breach of warranty). 
112. See Michael D. Green, The Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and 
Third Torts Restatements on Design Defects, 74 BROOK L. REV. 807, 815 (2009). 
113. See generally Prosser, supra note 46, at 1110-14 (arguing for extension of R 
strict liability to products beyond food). 
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. d (1965). 
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF  TORTS: PROD. LIAB. introductory cmt. (1998). 
“The major thrust of § 402A was to eliminate privity so that a user or consumer, with­
out having to establish negligence, could bring an action against a manufacturer, as well 
as against any other member of a distribution chain that had sold a product containing a 
manufacturing defect.” Id. 
116. See Back, 378 N.E.2d at 970.  The Supreme Judicial Court recognized how 
the issue of merchantability was a much clearer question when the product involved a 
manufacturing defect, by saying: 
If this were a case involving a manufacturing defect, the jury might simply
 
compare the propensities of the product as sold with those which the product’s
 
designer intended it to have and thereby reach a judgment as to whether the
 
deviation from the design rendered the product unreasonably dangerous and
 
therefore unfit for its ordinary purposes.
 
Id. 
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in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965),”117 it was a true 
statement in that the legislature had eliminated privity as a defense 
and had established strict liability for products that were not of 
merchantable quality.  Products that failed because they departed 
from the intended design and were not what they purported to be, 
i.e., products with manufacturing flaws, were plainly not of mer­
chantable quality when those flaws caused injury.118  It was left to 
Massachusetts courts to establish standards that would govern lia­
bility in design and warning cases, which have come to dominate 
modern products liability litigation.119  The extent to which the dec­
laration about the congruency of section 402A and the Massachu­
setts implied warranty of merchantability, which came to be a 
mantra in Massachusetts products liability law, remained true de­
pended on future decisions of Massachusetts courts and on the 
evolving meaning of section 402A, as it became infused with the 
decisions of the many courts which had adopted it. 
D. 1975-78: First Attempts to Create the Modern Doctrine 
The new implied warranty cause of action did not, by any 
means, abolish or make redundant the traditional negligence suit. 
Throughout the modern era, negligence and implied warranty have 
become intertwined as the two claims have been defined in refer­
ence to each other and in contrast to each other.  Massachusetts 
courts have used negligence principles and precedent to define and 
expand the duties owed to the consumer under the implied war­
ranty of merchantability.120  But as Massachusetts courts began 
their construction of the modern doctrine, even the old negligence 
cases were of limited value as the courts began to confront issues 
that had never been litigated in Massachusetts before.121  A reader 
of the opinions from the first part of the modern era will notice how 
117. Id. at 969. 
118. See id. at 969-70; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. d; see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(a) cmt. c. 
119. By contrast, issues involving manufacturing defects have scarcely troubled 
modern courts.  The huge litigation over exploding bottles in the pre-modern era, for 
example, has become a virtual nullity.  A search of Massachusetts cases since 1975 
reveals just a single published decision dealing with a claim of personal injury from a 
defective bottle. See Gleasons v. Source Perrier, 553 N.E.2d 544, 545-46 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1990); cf Evangelio v. Metro. Bottling Co., 158 N.E.2d 342, 345-46 (Mass. 1959) 
(canvassing numerous cases). 
120. See, e.g., Back, 378 N.E.2d at 970 (describing design defect inquiry under 
implied warranty of merchantability as essentially the same as negligence inquiry). 
121. See id. (citing decisions from other jurisdictions rather than older Massachu­
setts negligence cases). 
18 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE101.txt unknown Seq: 18 27-SEP-11 9:54 
WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
little precedent is cited and how that precedent provides only infer­
ential, rather than direct, support.122  Massachusetts courts were 
faced with a nearly blank canvas. 
1.	 Constructing a Methodology for the Judicial Review of 
Product Designs 
Coinciding with the amendments to the implied warranty of 
merchantability were bold attempts by plaintiffs’ lawyers during the 
1970s to challenge the designs of products.123  Massachusetts courts 
were thus forced, almost all at once, to resolve a number of conten­
tious and fundamental issues that were, at their root, policy judg­
ments about the reach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 
The first attempt to deal in a comprehensive way with design de­
fects came in Back v. Wickes Corp.,124 a case that later courts have 
recognized as establishing some of the important tenets of the mod­
ern doctrine by ritual citation of the decision.125 Back acknowl­
edged that reviewing a product’s design was a very different inquiry 
than had been conducted for manufacturing defects.126  In Back, 
the plaintiffs challenged the placement of the fuel tank on a motor 
home, contending that putting the tank outside the frame made it 
more vulnerable to puncture.127  The court saw this as a question of 
whether the manufacturer’s “conscious design choices . . . [had] ren­
dered the product unreasonably dangerous . . . [and] unfit for high­
way travel.”128  This was a key insight, and it followed from the 
manufacturer’s unrepentant contentions that the motor home was 
built exactly how it should have been, and that the vehicle con­
formed to industry safety standards.129  Unlike in Leblanc and 
Necktas, where the motor vehicles had plainly failed because they 
did not conform to their intended designs, the motor home failed, 
in the plaintiffs’ view, precisely because it did conform to the in­
tended design.130 
122. Id. 
123. Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for 
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1064 
(2009) [hereinafter Triumph of Risk-Utility] (noting how design cases began to reach 
juries in great numbers in 1970s). 
124. Back, 378 N.E.2d 964. 
125. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 386 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(citing Back, 378 N.E.2d at 970). 
126. Back, 387 N.E.2d at 970. 
127. Id. at 967. 
128. Id. at 970. 
129. Id. at 967-68. 
130. Id. (explaining plaintiff’s theory of vehicle’s design deficiencies). 
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After recognizing that a case alleging unreasonable, conscious 
design choices “present[ed] a more difficult jury question” than a 
case involving a manufacturing defect, Back set forth, for the first 
time in Massachusetts law, factors a jury should consider in evaluat­
ing the adequacy of a product’s design: (1) “gravity of the danger 
posed by the” design; (2) “likelihood” of the danger occurring; (3) 
“mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design”; (4) “cost of an 
improved design”; and (5) drawbacks of an alternative design “to 
the product and to the consumer.”131  These factors can be seen as 
drawing from the classic mathematical negligence test postulated by 
Judge Learned Hand in the well known decision of United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co.: B < PL.132  In that formulation, “L” repre­
sented the amount of the loss, and “P” represented the probability 
it would occur.133  If “B,” the burden of avoiding that loss, is less 
than “P” multiplied times “L,” then it would be negligent for an 
actor not to incur the costs of avoiding the loss.134  The enumerated 
Back factors suggest a similar comparison of the costs of accidents 
caused by a design with the costs of avoiding those accidents. The 
first two factors represent the “L” and the “P” from Hand’s test, 
and the final three factors represent aspects of “B,” the accident 
avoidance costs through a different design. This balancing process 
came to be known as the risk-utility test.135 
These factors were a needed elaboration on the general “rea­
sonable care” negligence standard.  Just three years earlier, in do-
Canto v. Ametek, Inc., the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the 
viability of a negligent design theory in a case involving a commer­
cial ironing machine.136  In doCanto, there was no expert testimony 
introduced about an alternative design that could have prevented 
the plaintiff’s hand from being pulled under the ironer.137  There 
was, on the other hand, evidence about pre-accident and post-acci­
dent safety improvements that were admitted for the purpose of 
showing the manufacturer’s knowledge of the risk and the feasibil­
131. Id. at 970. 
132. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. See, e.g., Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990) 
(noting that the risk-utility factors in Back v. Wickes Corp. “requires an inquiry essen­
tially the same as the negligence inquiry”), vacated on other grounds, 505 U.S. 1215 
(1992), remanded to 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992). 
136. doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873, 876-79 (Mass. 1975). 
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ity of making those improvements to the product.138  This evidence, 
along with the fact that the employee who designed the product 
knew about the risk, was enough to submit the negligent design 
claim to the jury.139  As significant as it was to subject a manufac­
turer’s design choices to judicial review, doCanto did not see its 
decision as a matter of public policy, but rather as another permuta­
tion of longstanding negligence principles.140 
While the enumerated Back factors made design review more 
concrete, they were not an exclusive list, and Back did not indicate 
how they would be weighed against each other or against 
unenumerated factors.  More crucially, it was not clear that a safer 
alternative design was essential to showing that the product was de­
fectively designed.  In Smith v. Ariens Co., decided on the same day 
as Back, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the plaintiff’s judgment 
based on the negligent design of a snowmobile that had sharp metal 
protrusions on a handle bar.141  When the plaintiff became involved 
in a collision, her face struck the protrusions, and she suffered seri­
ous injuries.142 Smith did not balance the Back factors, and it did 
not address the fact that the plaintiff had not introduced evidence 
of an alternative design.143  Six months after Back and Smith, Uloth 
v. City Tank Corp., hinted that a safer alternative design was a nec­
138. Id. at 876-77. 
139. Id. at 877. 
140. Id.  The court saw design review as just another species of negligence.  In 
support, it cited two negligent failure to warn cases, Carter v. Yarkley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 
693 (Mass. 1946), and Mealey v. Super Curline Hair Weave Corp., 173 N.E.2d 84 (Mass. 
1961), which were from the pre-modern era and the court saw no need to explain how 
those precedents applied in a negligent design case. 
141. Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 955-57 (Mass. 1978). 
142. Id. at 955. 
143. Id. at 957-58.  The manufacturer in Smith took aim at the fact that the plain­
tiff had “not introduce[d] any expert testimony tending to show that the snowmobile 
was negligently designed.” Id. at 957.  As the court held in doCanto, expert testimony 
was not essential where jurors using their lay knowledge could conclude that the design 
presents unreasonable risks of injury. Id.; doCanto, 328 N.E.2d at 877. While the de­
sign feature in Smith was not very complicated, and it did seem to present needless 
dangers, doCanto could have been distinguished in that there was other evidence of 
alternative designs that were technologically feasible and practical; this evidence, while 
not in the form of expert testimony, came in the form of pre-accident and post-accident 
improvements. Id. at 875-76. Smith found there was sufficient evidence of negligent 
design, noting “the absence of guards to cover [the protrusions].” Id. at 958. Yet, the 
jury apparently had no evidence about how the presence of guards would have been 
accommodated in the layout and design of the snowmobile, how it would have impacted 
the operation or handling of the machine, or how it would have increased the cost of 
the product. Id. at 957-58.  Persuasive evidence probably could have been introduced 
on these issues, but without it, the jury’s evaluation of the snowmobile’s design must 
have been somewhat speculative. 
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essary element of the plaintiff’s proof but did not say so explic­
itly.144  In Uloth, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld a plaintiff’s 
design defect claim in part by distinguishing its decision in Schaeffer 
v. General Motors Corp.,145 which held that the plaintiff had not 
presented enough evidence for a jury to conclude that the product 
contained a design defect.146 Uloth distinguished Schaeffer by 
pointing out that “Schaeffer did not offer proof that the [part] could 
have been designed to perform the same function in a safer fash­
ion.”147  In contrast, the plaintiff in Uloth showed evidence of alter­
native designs that would have reduced the danger without 
significantly reducing efficiency.148  Later in the Uloth opinion, the 
court stated that “there is a case for the jury if the plaintiff can show 
an available design modification which would reduce the risk with­
out undue cost or interference with the performance of the 
machinery.”149 
Despite these hints, the necessity of a safer alternative design 
remained a mystery. Back, by its formulation, was an open-ended, 
multi-factor test which attempted to retain a maximum of flexibility 
as Massachusetts courts developed the parameters of the new doc­
trine.150  The plaintiffs in Back had, in fact, introduced evidence of 
alternative designs.151  The plaintiff in Smith had not, and the court 
upheld the claim nonetheless.152  In reality, the Supreme Judicial 
Court seems not to have appreciated the importance of requiring, 
or deciding not to require, proof of an alternative design.  After all, 
Back’s open-ended risk-utility test was derived from the law in 
other jurisdictions,153 and it was becoming the majority rule in de­
sign cases.154  Courts in those other jurisdictions,155 and even schol­
ars in the field,156 did not see the need to make the fine point of 
144. Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1193 (Mass. 1978). 
145. Id. at 1191 (discussing Schaeffer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d 1062, 
1064 (Mass. 1977)). 
146. Schaeffer, 360 N.E.2d at 1064. 
147. Uloth, 384 N.E.2d at 1191. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 1193. 
150. Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978). 
151. Id. at 967. 
152. See Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 954-58 (Mass. 1978). 
153. See Back, 378 N.E.2d at 970 (citing cases from other jurisdictions). 
154. See John H. Chun, Note, The New Citadel: A Reasonably Designed Products 
Liability Restatement, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1654, 1658 (1994). 
155. See Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978); Bowman v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 242 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
156. See W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 39 
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whether a safer alternative design was simply a factor, or an essen­
tial factor.  Moreover, these early modern era cases in Massachu­
setts did not squarely present the question.  Even in Smith, which 
allowed recovery without evidence of an alternative design, the de­
fendant appears not to have argued the point.157  Later cases 
outside of Massachusetts and in Massachusetts made it necessary to 
face this issue head-on.158  The Supreme Judicial Court can be for­
given then for creating this ambiguity in its initial foray into design 
defect cases.  It is more perplexing that this ambiguity continues in 
Massachusetts over thirty years later. 
2. Breaking Away from the Hidden Danger Paradigm 
As this Article has previously explained, Massachusetts prod­
ucts liability law in the pre-modern period was primarily concerned 
with hidden dangers to the consumer. The three seminal design 
cases decided in 1978, Uloth, Smith, and Back, dealt with the partic­
ular problems that patent dangers pose. They did away with the 
hidden danger paradigm and reached decisions that promoted con­
sumer protection in practical, cost-efficient ways. 
Uloth has become a classic illustration of the duty to design 
around patent risks, where the design changes can be made at rea­
sonable cost.159  At the time it was decided, that duty was far from 
established, and certainly not in Massachusetts.160  In Uloth, the 
plaintiff was working on a garbage truck, which was equipped with 
a rear step on which the workmen rode between stops.161  The 
plaintiff hopped onto the step and slipped into the trash compaction 
area, where his foot was severed by a descending blade.162  Evi­
dence of several alternative designs was presented at trial, including 
side steps for the workers, which would have reduced the danger 
ing Wade’s risk-utility factors as “[a] list of concerns,” not a liability test (citing John W. 
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 837-38 
(1973))). 
157. See Smith, 377 N.E.2d at 954-59. 
158. See discussion infra Parts II.C and III.D. 
159. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF  TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. l, illus. 14 
(1998) (illustration patterned from facts of Uloth). 
160. Uloth noted that one of the leading patent danger cases, Campo v. Scofield, 
95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950), had just recently been overruled. Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 
384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 n.5 (Mass. 1978); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF  TORTS: 
PROD. LIAB. § 2 reporters’ note to cmt. d (canvassing cases rejecting patent danger 
rule).  Some jurisdictions retain the patent danger rule. Id. 
161. Uloth, 384 N.E.2d at 1190-91. 
162. Id. at 1191. 
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with little impact on the efficiency of the machine.163  The manufac­
turers argued, as a general matter, that they only had a duty to warn 
of dangers attendant in their product.164  Of course, the danger of 
the descending blade was obvious, which meant that they had no 
duty at all, since there is no duty to warn of obvious dangers.165 
Uloth held, in effect, that a warning (or the obviousness of a danger 
which serves as a warning) may not substitute for a faulty design.166 
Uloth rejected the patent danger rule, which held that users of 
a product should bear any risks that were obvious.167  The rule held 
sway in most jurisdictions until the 1970s, but had never been ex­
plicitly announced in Massachusetts.168  In Uloth, the court rea­
soned that products liability “law . . . ‘ought to discourage misdesign 
rather than encouraging it in its obvious form.’”169  By departing 
from the hidden danger paradigm, Uloth made practical judgments 
about the world we live in.  It was unabashed social policy-making, 
rather than the mythical process of “finding” the law by tracing the 
logical consequences of precedent.  It was not lost on the Uloth 
court that the plaintiff was a forty-four year old man working as a 
general laborer for the town of Amesbury, that he had a learning 
disability, that he had little experience working on the garbage 
truck, and that he had received little training or instruction for the 
job he was doing.170  With this surely in mind, the court observed 
that “a user may not have a real alternative to using a dangerous 
product, as where a worker must either work on a dangerous ma­
chine or leave his job.”171 Uloth also found that “warning[s] [were] 
not effective in eliminating injuries due to instinctual reactions, mo­
mentary inadvertence, or forgetfulness on the part of a worker.”172 
The reason for “safety devices,” after all, “is to guard against such 
foreseeable situations.”173  The Supreme Judicial Court thus 
showed a tolerance for human frailties, and it recognized that mo­
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 1191-92. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 1192-93. 
167. Id. 
168. JAMES A. HENDERSON & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS  LIABILITY: 
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 169-70 (5th ed. 2004). 
169. Uloth, 384 N.E.2d at 1193 (quoting Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 476 
P.2d 713, 719 (Wash. App. 1970)). 
170. Id. at 1190, 1193. 
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mentary, foreseeable lapses in the execution of a task are different 
from careless or reckless conduct.174 
Smith and Back should also be seen as movement away from 
the hidden danger paradigm.  The hidden danger paradigm of the 
pre-modern era was premised, in part, on the notion that the con­
sumer did not receive what he bargained for.175  Put differently, the 
product had disappointed consumer expectations through a manu­
facturing defect,176 or because the lack of a warning made the user 
think the product was safer than it was. Back explicitly noted that 
“reasonable consumer expectations” are a legitimate part of deter­
mining whether it is “fit for [its] ordinary purposes” under the im­
plied warranty of merchantability.177 Smith and Back did not make 
those consumer expectations, or consumer choices, dispositive.178 
After all, the metal protrusions on the handle bar of the snowmo­
bile in Smith should have been obvious to any user.179  The pur­
chaser of the snowmobile chose that snowmobile among others on 
the market, and presumably could have bought another machine 
without that needless risk.  The design error of the motor home in 
Back, the unwise placement of the fuel tank,180 was surely less obvi­
ous, but it certainly was no secret either.  A careful consumer might 
have inspected the layout of the motor home and could have 
bought something else without the same risk.  It is even possible 
that the purchasers of the snowmobile and the motor home bought 
those models precisely because they were cheaper, perhaps because 
the manufacturers had invested less safety.  In Smith and Back, 
these consumer choices were beside the point where the products 
presented risks that could have been avoided at a reasonable cost. 
Thus, the focus of Massachusetts products liability law was shifting 
away from whether the consumer had “no notice”181 of the prod­
uct’s danger, to whether that danger, as a matter of social policy, 
should be eliminated. 
174. Id. at 1192 n.6. 
175. See Farley v. Edward Tower & Co., 171 N.E. 639, 640-42 (Mass. 1930) (im­
posing liability where consumer product used as intended and without any warnings 
caused injury to consumer, emphasizing unknown quality of risk to consumer). 
176. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998). 
177. Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978). 
178. See id. (noting fitness “depend[s] largely, although not exclusively, on rea­
sonable consumer expectations”). 
179. Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 957 (noting location of protrusions). 
180. Back, 378 N.E.2d at 967 (location of gas tank outside the perimeter of the 
chassis frame). 
181. Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 108 N.E. 474, 491 (Mass. 1915). 
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3. Breaking Away from the Intended Use Paradigm 
As was discussed in Parts I.A and I.B, cases in the pre-modern 
era involved consumers using products as the manufacturer had in­
tended.  For example, in Mealey v. Super Curline Hair Wave Corp., 
the injured plaintiff was using the hair product in exactly the way 
that the manufacturer had directed in the instructions to the prod­
uct.182  The cases of the pre-modern era tended not to deal with 
situations where a plaintiff had used a product in ways that the 
manufacturer had not explicitly intended, or where the product had 
been subjected to stresses the manufacturer had not intended.  At 
the beginning of the modern era, Massachusetts courts were 
presented with cases that raised the question of whether manufac­
turers and sellers could be held liable where a defective product 
caused injury in foreseeable, but unintended situations.  At stake 
was whether the manufacturer, or the courts using some indepen­
dent standard, would decide whether a product was defectively 
designed. 
Two of the first cases of the modern period held out hope to 
manufacturers that it would be their standards, i.e., the manufac­
turer’s intended uses of the product, that would decide whether a 
product contained a design defect. Schaeffer v. General Motors 
Corp. upheld a directed verdict for a manufacturer where an auto­
mobile mechanism, alleged by plaintiff to be defectively designed, 
had “adequately performed the functions for which it was designed 
and manufactured.”183  The court went on to say that a jury ques­
tion would have presented “if there were evidence indicating that 
the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from the differential’s failure to per­
form its intended function, but there was no such evidence.”184 
Missing was any attempt to second guess the manufacturer’s design 
choices since the mechanism had done what the manufacturer had 
intended it to do. Schaeffer was unwilling to undertake this inquiry 
despite there being, by its own admission, “considerable evidence 
. . . that the . . . [mechanism] might reduce safety and stability in 
certain road conditions.”185  The court apparently thought it would 
be inappropriate, for example, for a jury to delve into whether the 
mechanism, designed to improve safety in certain situations, might 
have reduced the vehicle’s overall safety, thereby inviting the jury 
182. Mealey v. Super Curline Hair Wave Corp.,173 N.E.2d 84, 86 (Mass. 1961). 
183. See Schaeffer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (Mass. 1977). 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 1064-65. 
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to decide that the manufacturer had been unreasonable in its design 
choices.186 Schaeffer cited as support doCanto v. Ametek, Inc.,187 
which did not explicitly adopt the intended use paradigm, but do-
Canto was consistent with the result reached in Schaeffer.188  In do-
Canto, the product’s improper design had caused it to fail to 
perform a function that the manufacturer had affirmatively prom­
ised that it would perform.189 
These decisions show that it was not inevitable that Massachu­
setts courts and juries would conduct their own cost/benefit analy­
ses of manufacturer’s design choices.  Until the mid-1970s, courts 
around the country had been unwilling to impose liability where the 
product performed exactly in the way it was intended to perform.190 
It was, after all, possible for Massachusetts courts to have limited 
recovery to a narrow category of “self-defeating” design cases in 
which the product’s deficiency is much like a manufacturing defect 
because it fails to perform its “manifestly intended function.”191 
These cases stem from “inadvertent design errors,” mistakes made 
by the product designers that “if [the product designers] could have 
recaptured [the product] before it had hit the market and started 
hurting people, [they would] have done so. They are designs about 
which there is simply no argument that they may be okay.”192 
These cases are relatively rare, and it appears that they have not 
often made their way into the published decisions of Massachusetts 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 1064 (citing doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873 (Mass. 1975)). 
188. doCanto, 328 N.E.2d at 875-80. 
189. Id. at 877. 
190. Cf. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in 
Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 484 
(1990) (“[C]ourts generally were reluctant, until the mid-1970s, to impose liability for 
harm caused by product designs that performed exactly as they were intended to per­
form.  For example, when a driver of an automobile inadvertently crashed into a tree, 
courts traditionally refused to consider seriously the argument that the vehicle should 
have been designed to prevent or reduce injury to its occupants.  Notwithstanding pre­
dictions of doom from some quarters, courts gradually overcame their reluctance and 
by the late 1970s and the early 1980s they routinely imposed liability for harm caused by 
manufacturer’s conscious design choices.”). 
191. Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 123, at 1064. 
192. James A. Henderson, Jr., A Discussion and a Defense of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 19, 19 (1998); see James 
A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices: The 
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1547-52 (1973) [hereinafter Conscious 
Design Choices] (explanation of “inadvertent design errors”). 
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courts,193 but in other jurisdictions, courts were prepared, even 
prior to the publication of section 402A, to impose liability where 
products would “collapse during normal use because of inadver­
tently designed-in weaknesses.”194  For example, if brakes were de­
signed such that they failed unexpectedly, the argument for liability 
was unassailable.195  Limiting design review to these “inadvertent 
design error” cases would not have taxed the competence of courts 
to adjudicate these disputes since the matter of determining 
whether the product failed during its intended use is a question of 
engineering and mathematics, not value judgments about the ap­
propriate level of safety.196  In 1973, one influential scholar and law 
professor from Massachusetts argued against extending judicial re­
view beyond the inadvertent design error cases, calling the review 
of conscious design choices “a suicide mission” for courts.197 
And yet, Smith and Back, just a year after Schaeffer, under­
took the difficult task of assessing the reasonableness of manufac­
turers’ design choices.  In Smith, the defendant argued that a 
product need only be fit for its intended purpose, and that intended 
purpose did not include participation in collisions.198  After all, no 
manufacturer intends for its products to become involved in acci­
dents.  The defendant argued that it owed no duty to design its 
product in a way that would help protect the user in a collision.199 
193. But see Carey v. Gen. Motors Corp., 387 N.E.2d 583, 588 (Mass. 1979) (not­
ing that design defects alleged by plaintiff were based on improper engineering 
practice). 
194. Conscious Design Choices, supra note 192, at 1551. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 1552 (“In effect, the intended design serves as a standard with which to 
assess (and almost automatically condemn) the actual design.”).  See also Carey, in 
which the proof advanced by plaintiff was the testimony of a mechanical engineer about 
proper engineering practice. Carey, 387 N.E.2d at 585-88.  There was no need to en­
gage in balancing the costs and benefits of the manufacturer’s design choices through 
the Back factors.  Indeed, the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert about the inadvisability 
of using thin plastic in a small, but essential, automobile part could hardly be disputed 
by the manufacturer, which had issued a recall for the part. Id. at 588. This illustrates 
the true test for distinguishing an inadvertent design error case from a conscious choice 
design case: if the designer could have turned back time and changed the design deci­
sion, would he have done so?  In an inadvertent design error case, the designer surely 
would do so.  In a conscious design case, the designer would stand by the judgment calls 
he made in balancing safety with other factors. See Brocklesby v. United States, 767 
F.2d 1288, 1295 (9th Cir. 1985) (illustrating an inadvertent design error case where an 
airplane crashed into mountain because aeronautical chart, deemed to be a “product,” 
was inaccurate). 
197. Conscious Design Choices, supra note 192, at 1578. R 




\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE101.txt unknown Seq: 28 27-SEP-11 9:54 
WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
The defendants in Back made essentially the same argument, 
except that they maintained that a motor home crashing into a 
highway railing was “an extraordinary” use, or misuse, of the prod­
uct.200  In either formulation, a departure from the intended use of 
the product would work to completely cut off liability before any of 
the manufacturer’s design decisions were considered. The Supreme 
Judicial Court opted to break away from the intended use para­
digm, and in so doing, insisted that the proper question was the 
reasonable foreseeability of the use.201 
Back held that “a manufacturer must anticipate the environ­
ment in which its product will be used, and it must design against 
the reasonably foreseeable risks attending the product’s use in that 
setting.”202  In both Smith, a case involving a snowmobile accident, 
and Back, a case about a highway accident involving a motor home, 
the risks from an accident were found to be sufficiently foreseeable 
that the designer had a duty to minimize the likelihood of injury in 
the event of a crash.203  Crashworthiness and foreseeability were 
not absolute concepts.  The designer had no duty to anticipate “bi­
zarre, unforeseeable accidents,”204 and it needed only to prevent 
the user from being subjected “to unreasonable risks”205 in a colli­
sion.  The Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that it was wading 
into matters of social policy, noting that the “major argument” 
against extending tort liability to crashworthiness cases was that the 
legislature should make decisions about design standards.206  The 
court decided it would intervene, at least temporarily, until the leg­
islature acted.207 
Defendants made another stab at reviving the intended use/ 
intended function paradigm a year later in Uloth.208  After all, the 
garbage truck had performed “precisely as intended,” and there­
fore, according to the manufacturers, could not have been negli­
gently designed.209  The Supreme Judicial Court brushed aside the 
200. Back v. Wickes Co., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968 (Mass. 1978). 
201. Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 190, at 484. R 
202. Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969. 
203. Smith, 377 N.E.2d at 957; Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969-70. 
204. Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969. 
205. Smith, 377 N.E.2d at 957. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978). 
209. Id. at 1191. 
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defendants’ invocation of Schaeffer,210 and by then it was confident 
enough to state that “the focus in design negligence cases is not on 
how the product is meant to function, but on whether the product is 
designed with reasonable care to eliminate avoidable dangers.”211 
In other words, the manufacturer’s intended function of the product 
had gone from being dispositive to being almost beside the point. 
The question, quite simply, was how the product ought to function, 
as determined by courts and juries. 
4.	 The Interplay Between Warranty and Negligence and the 
Importance of Doctrinal Labels 
The early cases of the modern era attempted to stake out dif­
ferences between implied warranty and negligence liability, but the 
congruity between the two theories was more impressive than the 
distinctions.  Only later did Massachusetts courts become preoccu­
pied by the doctrinal labels, with rather unfortunate results, as this 
Article argues in Parts II and III. Smith, Uloth, doCanto, and 
Schaeffer were all negligence cases.212 Back was an implied war­
ranty case, but it conceded that a jury reviewing the manufacturer’s 
conscious design choices under the implied warranty of 
merchantability “must weigh competing factors much as they would 
in determining the fault of the defendant in a negligence case.”213 
In other words, the functional analysis for warranty and negligence 
was the same.  The real story then was that the Supreme Judicial 
Court had affected a sea change in Massachusetts products liability 
law through changes to the common law of negligence, not because 
the implied warranty of merchantability had enlarged consumer 
protection.  Had that been the lesson of these early modern prod­
ucts liability cases, the development of the implied warranty of 
merchantability and of negligence theory would have proceeded 
more or less in tandem.  There would have been no need to make 
210. Id.  Uloth’s attempt to distinguish Schaeffer is not persuasive.  Rather than 
announcing that “intended function” was no longer the touchstone for design review, 
and thereby clearly relegating Schaeffer to the ash heap, Uloth claimed that the plaintiff 
failed in Schaeffer because he had failed to provide proof of a safer alternative design. 
Id.  There is nothing in Schaeffer to indicate that the court was remotely interested in 
weighing the costs and benefits of a different version of the product. The issue began 
and ended with the fact that the allegedly defective automobile part had done what it 
was designed to do.  Schaeffer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (Mass. 
1977).  There is no credible way to reconcile Schaeffer and Uloth. 
211. Uloth, 384 N.E.2d at 1191. 
212. See supra Parts I.D.1, I.D.2, and I.D.3. 
213. Back v. Wickes Co., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978). 
30 
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pained attempts to distinguish the old negligence cause of action 
from its supposedly more progressive brethren, the implied war­
ranty of merchantability.  Instead, Back’s attempts in dicta to ex­
plain the differences between the two theories became maxims 
upon which future cases would founder. 
These maxims, destined to be repeated and puzzled over, are 
as follows: 
1. The Strict Liability Maxim: The amendments to the im­
plied warranty of merchantability “[had] transformed [it] into a 
remedy intended to be fully as comprehensive as the strict lia­
bility theory of recovery that has been adopted by a great 
many other jurisdictions.”214 
2. The 402A Maxim: “Massachusetts law of warranty [is] con­
gruent in nearly all respects with the principles expressed in 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).”215  As a result, 
strict liability cases in other jurisdictions are a useful guide to 
interpreting the implied warrant of merchantability.216 
3. The Product, Not Conduct Maxim: Warranty focuses on 
the product’s characteristics, not the defendant’s conduct, as 
negligence does.217 
From these maxims, the strict liability conundrum was born. 
As this Article has previously argued, both section 402A of the Re­
statement (Second) of Torts and the amendments to the Massachu­
setts implied warranty of merchantability, as they were initially 
conceived, had the similar, and comparatively modest, goals of 
abolishing the privity rule, removing various encumbrances from 
the law of sales, and extending strict liability to manufacturing de­
fects.218  Later, section 402A and the Massachusetts implied war­
ranty of merchantability came to be interpreted as extending strict 
liability to design and warning cases.219  The remainder of this Arti­
cle will explore how Massachusetts courts have tried, in many cases 
with unsatisfactory results, to come to terms with the idea of strict 
liability.  Before doing so, it is important to observe that Back, as it 
was making the statements that would become inflexible maxims, 
was hardly attempting to apply liability without fault on its facts. 
Back insisted that it was reasonable foreseeability, in the classic 
214. Id. at 968. 
215. Id. at 969. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 970. 
218. See supra Part I.A. 
219. See Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 123, at 1062-63. 
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negligence formulation, that defined the duty to be owed.220  The 
duty to design a crashworthy vehicle was a rule of reason, and no 
vehicle would be required to be “collision-proof.”221  Even as it was 
making the logically inconsistent statement that the focus should be 
on the product, not the defendant conduct, where the alleged fault 
in the product lay in the defendant’s conscious design choices (i.e., 
the defendant’s conduct), Back hastened to add that “the nature of 
the decision is essentially the same.”222 
This important qualifier would be forgotten by some Massa­
chusetts courts.  The criticisms, which follow in this Article, are crit­
icisms directed at the strange and circuitous voyage taken by 
Massachusetts courts in subsequent years where they became 
overly interested in adherence to these maxims and to doctrinal la­
bels.  These criticisms are not directed at Back or at the other early 
landmark cases of the modern period, which did not display doctri­
nal rigidity but instead did away with it. The fault lies not in Back 
but in the misbegotten interpretations of its maxims. 
II. STRICT LIABILITY BECOMES A MUDDLE: 1983 TO 1992 
The second (or middle) part of the modern era of Massachu­
setts products liability law saw the creation of two entirely avoida­
ble controversies: the unreasonable use defense, and the hindsight 
test for warning claims.  It also saw the ambiguity over the necessity 
of a safer alternative design present itself in more concrete ways, 
yet the ambiguity remained (and still remains) unresolved. These 
issues led to incoherence and confusion in Massachusetts products 
liability law, and they have unnaturally limited or foreclosed recov­
ery to plaintiffs injured by defective products.  During this time, 
Massachusetts courts became more concerned with delineating the 
theoretical distinctions between negligence and warranty (i.e., strict 
liability) and staying true to the maxims outlined in Part I.D.4 than 
shaping the law in a practical way to promote an optimal level of 
consumer protection. 
220. Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969; see Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 
(N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.) (“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be 
obeyed . . . .”). 
221. Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969. 
222. Id. at 970. 
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A. The Lamentable “Unreasonable Use” Defense 
The middle part of the modern era began with the Supreme 
Judicial Court’s 1983 decision in Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co.,223 which spawned the “unreasonable use” or “Correia” de­
fense.224  The case was presented to the Supreme Judicial Court as a 
set of certified questions from federal court having to do with the 
alleged negligence on the part of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s em­
ployer.225  The plaintiff’s decedent was driving his employer’s trac­
tor-trailer loaded with steel plates when one of the tires blew out, 
causing an accident that led to the death of the employee.226  One 
of the questions asked was whether contributory or comparative 
negligence could be a partial or complete defense to an implied 
warranty of merchantability claim.227 Correia concluded that the 
Massachusetts comparative negligence statute did not “literally ap­
ply,” since the warranty claim was essentially strict liability in tort, 
not negligence.228  It invoked the Strict Liability Maxim, the 402A 
Maxim, and the Product, Not Conduct Maxim to sharply contrast 
strict liability from negligence.229  Calling upon comment c to sec­
tion 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court de­
scribed strict liability in terms of social justice, invoking the 
“‘special responsibility’” of “‘reputable sellers [to] stand behind 
their goods.’”230  “‘[P]ublic policy demand[ed]’” strict liability.231 
This theory of liability was further premised upon the “‘right[s]’” of 
the public, and the notion that the consumer is “‘entitled to the 
maximum of protection’” from those who could “‘afford it.’”232 
This description logically suggested an uncompromising standard 
once the rights and entitlements of the powerless public were ar­
rayed against powerful sellers and manufacturers. The populist 
tone and absolute language were more typical of constitutional 
223. Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. 1983). 
224. The confusion about this defense, described below, has prompted courts to 
eschew the more descriptive unreasonable use moniker in favor of simply “Correia.” 
See Haglund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 315, 323 (Mass. 2006) (analyzing the 
“Correia” defense).  This Article will use both terms but will take care to distinguish 
this defense from other, closely related concepts. 
225. Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1033. 
226. Id. at 1034. 
227. Id. at 1039. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 1039-40. 
230. Id. at 1040 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF  TORTS § 402A cmt. c 
(1965)). 
231. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c). 
232. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c). 
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law,233 with its emphasis on indefeasible rights, than traditionally 
flexible tort doctrines.  Strict liability, Correia maintained, imposed 
a duty “unknown in the law of negligence,” which is not fulfilled 
even upon the exercise of all reasonable care.234 
In propounding this theory of strict liability, Correia never 
paused to consider the theory of defect the plaintiff alleged.235  It is 
unclear whether the plaintiff had claimed that the tire contained a 
manufacturing defect that caused the blowout, or whether the tire 
contained a design defect that caused the tire to fail prematurely 
under a load that it should have handled.236  The Supreme Judicial 
Court had clearly recognized the difference between manufacturing 
and design defects in cases like Back and Smith.  Those decisions 
had held that courts should apply a rule of reason for products al­
leged to be defectively designed.237  After all, no tire can be ex­
pected to last forever, nor can it handle an unlimited amount of 
weight; the circumstances of the product failure had to be reckoned 
with.  By not considering or addressing the distinction between 
manufacturing and design defects, Correia began to set in cement 
the idea that strict liability applied in all types of products liability 
cases.  This idea would lead to unfortunate, and perhaps unin­
tended, consequences. 
Having expressed the strict liability rhetoric, Correia felt com­
pelled to invent a restriction on this expansive theory of recovery. 
It announced, without citation to authority, that “[w]hen a user un­
reasonably proceeds to use a product which he knows to be defec­
tive and dangerous, he violates that duty [to act reasonably] and 
relinquishes the protection of the law.”238  In a stroke, the court 
created a complete defense to “balance[ ]” what it imagined was a 
very robust theory of liability.239  The “unreasonabl[e] use[ ]” of the 
product was thought to be the sole “proximate cause of [the plain­
tiff’s] injuries as a matter of law,” which would appropriately deny 
233. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (First Amendment rights not to be balanced against other interests). 
234. Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1040. 
235. Id. at 1040-41 (describing liability under implied warranty of merchantability 
without analyzing type of defect alleged by plaintiff). 
236. Id. at 1034. 
237. Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (Mass. 1978) (emphasizing that 
“warranty liability is not absolute liability” and there is no duty to make vehicle “colli­
sion-proof”); Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 957 (Mass. 1978) (adopting reasona­
ble care standard). 
238. Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1040. 
239. Id. 
34 
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all recovery.240  The doctrinal inconsistencies in this new defense 
should have been readily apparent.  First, it looked remarkably sim­
ilar to the assumption of risk defense abolished by the Massachu­
setts legislature.241 Correia could avoid the assumption of risk bar 
since it only applied to negligence, which it insisted was a “well­
defined” sphere separate from strict liability.242  Neither Correia, 
nor any subsequent decision of a Massachusetts court, has at­
tempted to justify how such a significant restriction on warranty lia­
bility could comport with the legislature’s intent when: (1) the 
legislature did not provide for it; (2) the legislature had abolished 
assumption of the risk to make negligence a more generous means 
of recovery; and (3) the legislature had made warranty law still 
more generous than negligence law. 
Additionally, the very nature of the Correia defense was at 
odds with the recently decided Uloth, which remains undisturbed to 
the present, and which has never been meaningfully distinguished. 
After all, had not the garbage truck worker known of the patent 
danger posed by the descending teeth of the trash compactor and 
nonetheless proceeded to work on the back of the truck? Uloth 
itself felt compelled to analyze this conduct to determine whether it 
fell within the old assumption of the risk defense, which applied 
since the accident had predated the abolition of that defense.243  It 
is hard to imagine how Uloth would not have been subject to the 
unreasonable use defense.  The great insight of Uloth, which the 
reporters for the new Restatement have called in their survey of the 
law the leading design defect case in Massachusetts,244 was the abo­
lition of the patent danger rule.245  Decisions subsequent to Correia 
have failed to give much definition to the second prong of the de­
fense, “unreasonably” proceeding toward the danger.246  It appears 
240. Id. 
241. See Riley v. Davison Constr. Co., 409 N.E.2d 1279, 1282-84 (Mass. 1980) 
(describing defenses and their histories, including statutory repeal of the assumption of 
risk defense). 
242. Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1040. 
243. Id. 1193 n.7. 
244. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 Reporters’ Note (1998). 
245. Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978) (rejecting pat­
ent danger rule because burden of preventing “needless injury” should be placed on 
manufacturer). 
246. See, e.g., Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1312-13 (Mass. 
1988) (worker injured when trying to put grease in industrial machine in quasi-emer­
gency situation barred from recovery under warranty due to unreasonable use defense; 
no discussion of what made the conduct, beyond knowledge of the danger, 
unreasonable). 
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to be enough that the plaintiff knew of the danger and used the 
product anyway.247  There is nothing more to the unreasonableness 
component than using the product with knowledge of the danger, 
making it indistinguishable in practice from the patent danger rule 
condemned in Uloth. 
In theory, the unreasonable use defense differed slightly from 
assumption of the risk in that Correia contained a subjective ele­
ment of whether the plaintiff knew of the danger, and an objective 
element of “unreasonably” proceeding toward it.248  Paradoxically, 
the Correia defense was more protective of defendants than the old 
assumption of risk defense.  The objective element of Correia 
meant that the more nuanced consideration of the plaintiff’s partic­
ular characteristics was gone.  In Uloth, the court decided that a 
directed verdict for the defense was not warranted in part because 
the plaintiff was a slow learner, had never received instructions, and 
was inexperienced.249  All of this went to the issue of whether that 
particular user had subjectively known and appreciated the risks of 
working on the garbage truck.250  Further, Uloth noted that it was 
rare for a court to determine, as a matter of law, that a plaintiff had 
assumed the risk; it was typically a jury question.251  By its formula­
tion, the Correia defense opened the door to courts to make the 
objective “unreasonable use” determinations as a matter of law, 
which would preclude recovery before the plaintiff reached a 
jury.252 
Ironically, Correia became the greatest victory for product 
manufacturers and sellers in the modern era of Massachusetts prod­
ucts liability law.  It traded the rhetorical triumph of strict liability 
for an enormous litigation advantage which defendants would em­
ploy to great effect.253  In Correia itself, the defendant tire manu­
facturer, Firestone, had argued for the application of the 
comparative negligence statute to warranty actions.254  The Su­
preme Judicial Court turned aside Firestone’s arguments for the ap­
247. See, e.g., id. 
248. Allen v. Chance Mfg. Co. (Allen I), 494 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (Mass. 1986). 
249. Uloth, 384 N.E.2d at 1193. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. See Wasylow v. Glock, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 370, 380 (D. Mass. 1996) (granting 
summary judgment in part due to Correia defense). 
253. Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1312-14 (Mass. 1988) (plain­
tiff barred from recovery under warranty theory even though defendant negligent in 
designing product). 
254. Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1039 (Mass. 1983). 
36 
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plication of what is often a partial defense, and maintained, for the 
moment, the rhetorical and theoretical purity of strict liability.255 
But it had given Firestone a complete defense that was more effec­
tive in defeating recovery.256  Because the unreasonable use de­
fense was created out of whole cloth, Firestone could scarcely have 
predicted such a result, or have expected to do so well. Correia was 
not a bad decision because it is unhelpful to plaintiffs. Correia was 
a bad decision not only because it is confusing and requires mind-
bending inquiries by courts and juries, but mostly because it blocks 
liability where it should be imposed and it attempts to extend liabil­
ity where it should not. 
After Correia, Massachusetts courts quickly experienced diffi­
culty in applying it.  Because Back, Smith, and Uloth had held that 
the manufacturer’s duty to design and provide warnings turned on 
the reasonable foreseeability of the uses of the product, and not just 
on the manufacturer’s intended uses, it became necessary to parse 
out “misuse,” “unforeseeable use[ ],” and “unreasonable mis­
use.”257  Since it was not enough to simply cry that a plaintiff had 
misused a product, a court was called upon to assess whether the 
use was reasonably foreseeable.258  If the use was reasonably fore­
seeable, then the manufacturer had a duty to take reasonable steps 
to design around that use.259  It was the burden of the plaintiff to 
show reasonable foreseeability, since it was the plaintiff’s burden to 
prove the existence of the manufacturer’s duty.260  The Massachu­
setts Appeals Court in Fahey v. Rockwell261 then read Correia to 
say that “unforeseeable misuse” and “unreasonable use” could be 
used interchangeably.262 
The next year, in Allen v. Chance Manufacturing Co. (Allen I), 
the Supreme Judicial Court was confronted with a certified ques­
tion from a federal district court confused about the state of the 
law.263  The federal court asked whether the “misuse defense” ap­
plied to foreseeable and unforeseeable uses of the product in a 
255. Id. at 1040-41. 
256. Id. 
257. See generally, Allen I, 494 N.E.2d 1324, 1325-27 (Mass. 1986) (trying to ex­
plain the interplay between the three concepts). 
258. See Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968-69 (Mass. 1978). 
259. Id. 
260. See Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1041 n.15; Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969. 
261. Fahey v. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc., 482 N.E.2d 519, 525-26 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1985). 
262. Id. at 526 n.13. 
263. Allen I, 494 N.E.2d 1324, 1325-26 (Mass. 1986). 
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breach of implied warranty action.264 Allen I attempted to alleviate 
the confusion first by noting that there never had been a “misuse 
defense” to a warranty claim.265  Second, Allen I said that it was the 
plaintiff’s burden to prove the reasonable foreseeability of his use 
of the product, and that it was an affirmative defense for the defen­
dant to prove that the plaintiff had unreasonably used the product 
within the meaning of Correia.266  These two inquires, Allen I main­
tained, had “nothing to do” with each other.267  Thus, only after the 
plaintiff had proved that his use of the product was reasonably fore­
seeable, would the defendant attempt to show that the use was un­
reasonable.268  Having set out this methodology, Allen I took the 
opportunity to correct Fahey’s statement that “unreasonable use” 
and “unforeseeable misuse” could be used interchangeably.269 
These fine distinctions caused obvious doctrinal tensions, not 
to mention a level of abstraction apt to perplex the most attentive 
and intelligent jury.  After Correia, a trial court and the jury would 
be required to assess the plaintiff’s use of the product through a 
number of different lenses.  Take, for example, the facts of Fahey, 
which involved a worker who removed a safety guard on a printing 
press and then performed a common task (removing an impurity 
from a plate) that caused his arm to be pulled into the press, crush­
ing it.270  After the decision of the appeals court, the case was to be 
submitted to a jury.271  First, it would have been necessary for the 
jury to determine whether the plaintiff’s removal of the impurity 
after removing the guard was reasonably foreseeable as part of the 
plaintiff’s proof on negligent design and breach of warranty, taking 
into account the amount of inefficiency and waste of time caused by 
the placement of the guard on the machine, which were considera­
ble.272  Second, these same actions would have been assessed to de­
termine whether the plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by 
the design of the product or by some intervening cause, such as the 
264. Id. at 1325. 
265. Id. at 1326. 
266. Id. at 1326-27. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. at 1326. 
269. Id. at 1327 n.2. 
270. Fahey v. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc., 482 N.E.2d 519, 521-22 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1985). 
271. Id. at 529. 
272. Id. at 523-24. 
38 
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plaintiff’s own conduct.273  This proximate cause question would 
turn on the foreseeability of the plaintiff’s removal of the guard.274 
Third, the plaintiff’s conduct would have been considered to deter­
mine the plaintiff’s degree of negligence (i.e., the reasonableness of 
his conduct, taking into account the risks and benefits of removing 
the guard) under the comparative fault statute.275  Fourth, the 
plaintiff’s actions would have to be examined to determine whether 
they were knowing and unreasonable, as part of the Correia de­
fense, presumably taking into account the same risks and benefits 
of removing the guard.276  The court and the jury would have to 
also understand as part of Correia that the unreasonable use in­
quiry was separate from the plaintiff’s “ordinary negligence,” which 
is irrelevant on the warranty claim.277  All of these issues overlap to 
such a degree that they collapse into a single question: How reason­
able was it for the plaintiff to remove the guard and to continue to 
do his job?  It is no wonder that Allen I acknowledged that distin­
guishing misuse from Correia (or the old assumption of the risk de­
fense) “has proven to be difficult to achieve.”278 
The falseness of the distinction between “unforeseeable mis­
use” and “unreasonableness use” in a case like Fahey is explained 
by one prominent scholar in explaining how misuse and proximate 
cause meld into one question: 
If a court determines that a design defect exists [solely] because 
the manufacturer has failed to include . . . safety devices, there is 
no proximate cause question of any moment left to consider. 
The very reason for declaring the design defective was to prevent 
this kind of foreseeable misuse.  Proximate cause could not, in 
273. See Richard v. Amer. Mfg. Co., 489 N.E.2d 214, 215 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1986) (finding of unreasonable use under Correia does not preclude finding for plaintiff 
on proximate cause, thus separating the two inquiries). 
274. See id. 
275. See id. at 215 (affirming verdict dividing responsibility between defendant 
and plaintiff); Fahey, 482 N.E.2d at 524 (comparative negligence question for jury). 
276. See Fahey, 482 N.E.2d at 526 (Correia defense to be decided by jury). 
277. See Hallmark Color Labs v. Damon Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1052, 1053-54 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1985) (jury instruction on Correia defense had to make clear that “ordinary 
negligence” was irrelevant); Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 
2001) (ordinary negligence irrelevant to breach of warranty claim). 
278. Allen I, 494 N.E.2d 1324, 1327 n.2 (Mass. 1986). Allen I went on to claim 
that the distinction was in fact clear as there were two different scenarios: (1) the plain­
tiff misuses the product when the danger posed by the defect is not apparent; and (2) 
the plaintiff misuses the product when the danger is apparent. Id. at 1326.  Only in the 
second situation would the Correia (or the old assumption of risk) defense apply.  Un­
fortunately in the second situation, the alleged “misuse” is usually alleged to be the 
knowing, unreasonable use of the product, as was true in Fahey. 
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such a case, present an obstacle on the grounds of misuse. To do 
so would negate the very reason for declaring the design defec­
tive in the first [place].279 
The Correia defense established yet another layer of reviewing 
the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct.  If, for example, it was 
determined in Fahey that it was reasonably foreseeable that the 
worker would have removed the guard because (1) the guard sub­
stantially increased the amount of time required to make the ma­
chine ready for operation; (2) the guard caused the press workers to 
have to stand off-balance while changing plates; and (3) the guard 
caused scratches to the plates, and the machine was defectively de­
signed because the guard could have been placed elsewhere at little 
cost and with increase productivity,280 then it would be redundant 
to ask, as part of the proximate cause question, whether the injury 
was a foreseeable result of the poor design.  It was a poor design 
because it encouraged the removal of the guard and made more 
likely the kind of injury that was in fact sustained.  It is increasingly 
redundant to ask under Correia whether using the product without 
the guard was unreasonable after having determined that it was rea­
sonably foreseeable for a press worker to do just that.  Massachu­
setts courts have struggled to find a coherent way to explain 
Correia for the simple reason that it cannot be done. 
Having firmly established Correia as an affirmative defense, 
Massachusetts courts were left with other doctrinal tensions. Cor­
reia decided that the knowing, unreasonable use of a product was, 
as a matter of law, the sole proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injury.281 
Proximate cause must be established by the plaintiff in his prima 
facie case to prevail.282  If “unreasonable use” simply negated an 
element of the plaintiff’s proof, it should not properly be thought of 
as a defense for which the plaintiff has the burden of proof.  If it is a 
true affirmative defense, then the plaintiff’s unreasonable use 
would only come into play once the plaintiff had established proxi­
mate cause, i.e., a sufficiently foreseeable causal connection be­
tween the product’s defect and the events leading to the injury,283 
which would already include the plaintiff’s use of the product. 
279. Aaron D. Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging 
Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403, 421 (1978). 
280. Fahey, 482 N.E.2d at 521-22. 
281. Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Mass. 1983). 
282. Id. 
283. See Delaney v. Reynolds, 825 N.E.2d 554, 556 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (proxi­
mate cause standard under Massachusetts law). 
40 
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Correia became more awkward still when the defendant in 
Colter v. Barber-Greene Co. attempted to apply the “unreasonable 
use” defense to a negligence claim.284  In Colter, an industrial 
worker was injured while trying to put grease into a machine while 
it was running in a situation that he considered to be an emer­
gency.285  The plaintiff’s theory, much like the theory of defect in 
Fahey, was that the machine was defectively designed because it 
encouraged the removal of a safety guard, which would have pre­
vented the injury had it been in place.286  At trial, the jury found 
that the plaintiff, manufacturer, and a seller of the product were 
each partially at fault, which entitled plaintiff to partial recovery on 
the negligence claim.287  The jury also found that the defendants 
had breached the implied warranty of merchantability, but found 
against the plaintiff on the Correia defense.288  The defendants ar­
gued that since they had prevailed on the Correia defense, the 
plaintiff’s unreasonable use was the “sole proximate cause” of his 
injuries, according to the plain language of Correia.289  If the plain­
tiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause for his injuries, which 
would ordinarily be a complete defense to a negligence claim, then 
the defendants would arguably be entitled to a judgment in their 
favor as a matter of law.290 
By making the Correia defense a part of proximate cause, the 
court in Colter found itself in an embarrassing position.  As Colter 
aptly pointed out, allowing the plaintiff’s negligent behavior to 
serve as a complete bar to recovery was foreclosed by the Massa­
chusetts comparative fault statute, which had abolished contribu­
tory negligence as a defense unless it was greater than the fault of 
the defendants.291  The jury in Colter had found that the plaintiff’s 
fault was not greater than the combined fault of two defendants, 
and the court could hardly make, as a matter of law, a contrary 
finding.292  Further, the assumption of risk defense was expressly 
abolished by the legislature in negligence cases.293  Admitting that 
the Correia defense and assumption of the risk were rather similar, 
284. Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1312 (Mass. 1988). 
285. Id. at 1308-09. 
286. Id. at 1309-10. 
287. Id. at 1307. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. at 1312-13. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. at 1314-15. 
292. Id. 
293. Id. at 1315 n.14. 
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Colter said that applying Correia in negligence actions “may” be 
precluded by the legislature’s action against assumption of the 
risk.294 Colter tried to escape this imbroglio by distinguishing the 
nature of proximate cause in warranty and negligence actions, stat­
ing that “negligence liability does not focus on a sole cause of the 
plaintiff’s injuries.”295  With that, Colter held that the Correia de­
fense would not apply to the negligence claim.296  It did, however, 
notice the incongruity of the results obtained.297  The supposedly 
more robust theory of recovery, breach of implied warranty, had 
been defeated by the all-or-nothing nature of the Correia defense. 
Because the jury was allowed to apportion fault on the negligence 
claim, the plaintiff could be allowed to recover damages for severe 
injuries caused by an admittedly defectively designed product.298 
The Colter court suggested that a “fairer system” be installed that 
would make the results in negligence and warranty cases “more 
consistent,” but this was a matter, it believed, for legislative ac­
tion.299  This plea for legislative assistance was strange in that the 
Correia defense had been a judicial creation, not the product of 
legislation.  Having perhaps not thought through the implications of 
this new, powerful defense, the court was asking for help to clean 
up the mess it had created. Colter apparently did not think abro­
gating Correia was a solution. 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in reviewing the jury ver­
dicts handed down in Allen v. Chance Manufacturing Co., (herein­
after Allen II), which followed the Supreme Judicial Court’s 
answers to certified questions in Allen I, soon faced the problems 
caused by Correia and Colter.300  In Allen II, the defendant sought 
to establish that the conduct of the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s em­
ployer was the “sole proximate cause” of the plaintiff’s injuries, 
which occurred while the plaintiff was using a product without 
safety goggles.301  The trial court had refused to give an instruction 
that stated that the product manufacturer was entitled to a verdict 
in its favor if the negligence of the employer or the plaintiff em­
294. Id. 
295. Id. at 1312-13. 
296. Id. at 1315. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. at 1314-15 (explaining how plaintiff could recover under negligence the­
ory even if partially at fault). 
299. Id. at 1315. 
300. Allen v. Chance Mfg. Co. (Allen II), 873 F.2d 465 (1st Cir. 1989). 
301. Id. at 467-71. 
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ployee was the “sole proximate cause” of the injuries.302  The First 
Circuit held that this was error and that the instruction should have 
been given with respect to the warranty claim as well as the negli­
gence claim, notwithstanding Colter’s reasoning that the concept of 
sole proximate cause does not apply to negligence actions.303 Allen 
II explained that Colter was trying to show why the Correia defense 
only applied to breach of warranty claims; it was not doing away 
with “sole proximate cause” entirely, a doctrine which the Correia 
decision itself recognized.304  In short, the Allen II court essentially 
repudiated the logic but not the holding of Colter, which was the 
most diplomatic way to extricate itself from the awkward spot the 
First Circuit found itself in.  It was thus apparent that Colter’s at­
tempt to square the circle in its explanation of why the Correia de­
fense would not apply to negligence actions had failed. The 
misbegotten Correia defense led to the unsatisfactory mental gym­
nastics in Colter, which led to the strained logic of Allen II, which in 
turn led to the strange result in Allen II.  On remand, the First Cir­
cuit held, the jury would have to consider whether the plaintiff’s 
failure to wear goggles was the “sole proximate cause” of his inju­
ries on the negligence and warranty claims, and then to consider 
whether that failure was the “sole proximate cause” of his injuries 
as a result of the Correia defense.305  Meanwhile, the jury would 
have to be told that the “ordinary negligence”306 of the plaintiff 
should be disregarded on the warranty claim, necessitating a deci­
sion on whether the failure to wear goggles was ordinary negli­
gence, or more severe negligence, before it even reached the 
Correia defense.  How these dual “sole proximate cause” inquiries, 
both relating to the same fairly simple factual issue, could be articu­
lated separately and coherently was left unsaid.307 
302. Id. at 467. 
303. Id. at 471. 
304. Id.; see also Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1038­
39 (Mass. 1983) (explicitly recognizing that negligence of plaintiff’s employer would be 
relevant to issue of sole proximate cause on negligence claim). 
305. Allen II, 873 F.2d at 473.  The court made it clear that the submission to the 
jury of the Correia defense would depend on the evidence developed about the plain­
tiff’s subjective awareness of the risk. Id. 
306. See Hallmark Color Labs, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1052, 1054 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1985). 
307. Richard v. Am. Mfg. Co., 489 N.E.2d 214, 215-16 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986). 
Presaging the result in Colter, the Richard court envisioned that a finding of unreasona­
ble use on a warranty count would not stop a jury from appropriately finding that the 
defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. 
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It may be persuasively argued that the test of a legal doctrine is 
not its logical consistency or its elegant formulation, but whether it 
consistently arrives, by one route or another, at satisfactory results. 
By that measure, the Correia doctrine should be found wanting. 
The Colter opinion, as previously noted, expressed misgivings about 
the end result, which gave the plaintiff a partial recovery under neg­
ligence, but nothing under warranty, due to the Correia defense.308 
In Richard, a worker whose hand was crushed for want of a simple 
guard was able to recover in a design case under negligence where 
the jury found the manufacturer 70% at fault and the worker 30% 
at fault.309  The worker recovered nothing on the warranty claim 
because of Correia.310 
A similar result was obtained in Cigna Insurance Co. v. Oy 
Saunatec, Ltd. where the plaintiff was found to be 35% negligent 
but was found to be guilty of unreasonable use, allowing partial re­
covery under negligence but nothing under warranty.311  These out­
comes show that the Correia defense has, in many cases, 
transformed the implied warranty of merchantability into an instru­
ment of consumer protection that is unforgiving to injured consum­
ers.  One practitioner recognized this dynamic shortly after Correia 
was decided, when he noted that the all or nothing nature of the 
unreasonable use defense presented something of a dilemma for 
plaintiff lawyers choosing an avenue of recovery.312  If an injured 
consumer is better off seeking compensation under a negligence 
theory that is intelligently applied and shorn of encumbrances like 
the patent danger rule,313 than under a warranty claim burdened by 
the Correia defense, is the implied warranty of merchantability a 
significant addition to the cause of consumer protection in Massa­
chusetts?  The Correia court certainly saw the Massachusetts ver­
sion of strict liability as significant, almost revolutionary, and 
effecting a large expansion of liability.314  It can be fairly said then 
that the Correia court failed to meet its own objectives. 
308. Colter v. Barber-Green Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1315 (Mass. 1988). 
309. Richard, 489 N.E.2d at 215. 
310. Id. 
311. Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001). 
312. Raymond J. Kenney, Jr., Defective Products in Massachusetts—A 1984 Up­
date, 69 MASS. L. REV. 108, 109 (1984). 
313. See Richard, 489 N.E.2d at 215 (affirming plaintiff’s verdict on negligent de­
sign on theory that machine lacked simple guard that could have been installed without 
undue cost) (citing Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (1978)). 
314. Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1038-40 (Mass. 
1983) (expansive language about how strict liability is different from negligence). 
44 
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It is finally worth asking why the Supreme Judicial Court, 
twelve years after the first amendments to the implied warranty of 
merchantability, and several years after the landmark decisions in 
Smith, Back, and Uloth, found it necessary to erect such a signifi­
cant barrier to recovery, bearing an uncanny resemblance to the 
assumption of risk defense abolished in negligence actions by the 
Massachusetts legislature?315  If the Correia decision had been an 
acknowledged retrenchment in products liability law, one coming 
after the court had realized that earlier decisions had expanded the 
rights of plaintiffs too much, the new defense would have been un­
derstandable.  Yet, Correia purported to do nothing of the kind, 
enthusiastically propounding an expansive theory of strict liabil­
ity.316  Perhaps the Correia court did not fully appreciate the impli­
cations of its decision, believing that “unreasonable use” would be a 
limited defense, especially with its qualifier that “ordinary negli­
gence” would do nothing to limit the plaintiff’s recovery on a war­
ranty claim.  If true, the court must have had dim memories of the 
assumption of risk defense, which had been part of Massachusetts 
law not long before.317  The real explanation lies with Correia’s 
unquestioning adherence to the 402A Maxim.  By 1983, section 
402A had become what some commentators have called a “holy 
writ,” because of its near universal adoption in the United States.318 
Section 402A contained, despite its bold advancement of strict lia­
bility in tort, vestiges of the law that existed prior to 1965, such as 
the assumption of the risk defense.319  The Correia defense is a reit­
eration of Comment n of section 402A, which stated the well-estab­
lished rule (for 1965) that assumption of the risk could completely 
bar recovery.320  Rather than engaging in practical policymaking, as 
the court did in Uloth, (which itself is difficult to square with the 
Correia defense), the Correia court placed its faith in the words of 
section 402A. 
315. See supra Part I.D for discussions of Smith, Back, and Uloth. 
316. Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1040. 
317. See Uloth, 384 N.E.2d at 1193 n.7 (noting assumption of risk abolished by 
statute as of January 1, 1974). 
318. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision 
of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1512 
(1992). 
319. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965). 
320. Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1040-41. 
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B. The Lamentable Hindsight Test 
While consumer protection advocates may have suffered a de­
feat with the invention of the Correia defense, they probably saw 
the adoption of the so-called “hindsight test” in failure to warn 
cases as the beginning of true strict liability in Massachusetts. This 
test, announced in the 1984 decision of Hayes v. Ariens Co., 
presumes that the manufacturer or seller knew of all the risks of the 
product and measures the duty to warn in warranty cases against 
that presumed knowledge.321  It is called the “hindsight test” be­
cause it imputes all of the knowledge of risk at the time of trial back 
to the time the alleged failure to warn occurred.322  It does not mat­
ter whether the defendant knew, should have known, or could have 
known about the risk at the time the product was made.323  Indeed, 
the knowledge may not have even existed at the time the product 
was made or sold.324  As such, it truly was liability without fault.325 
The hindsight test did not suffer from the doctrinal inconsisten­
cies and logical errors of the Correia defense; it was simply unwise 
policy.  While it might have lightened considerably the burdens of 
injured plaintiffs in proving their cases, and it might have turned 
manufacturers and sellers into virtual insurers of product users,326 
the victory for plaintiffs was ephemeral.  It was announced and re­
peated in contexts where it had no practical effect, in dicta.327 
When it came time to actually apply the hindsight test, courts, espe­
cially federal courts, blanched at imposing a duty to warn that man­
ufacturers and sellers could not perform.328  By 1998, the flirtation 
with true strict liability in warning cases was over when the Su­
preme Judicial Court decided in Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare 
Corp. to put an end to the hindsight test.329 
321. Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273 (Mass. 1984), abrogated by Vassallo v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998). 
322. Vasallo, 696 N.E.2d at 922-23. 
323. Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 277-78. 
324. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546 (N.J. 1982) (stat­
ing that the fact that the state of technology made the product unsafe does not matter 
under strict liability). 
325. Owen, supra note 97, at 978. 
326. See Beshada, 447 A.2d at 546-47 (adopting explicitly risk-spreading rationale 
for hindsight test while acknowledging that liability is not imposed for failing to do what 
should have been done). 
327. Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 277-78; Simmons v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 596 
N.E.2d 318, 320 n.3 (Mass. 1992). 
328. See Anderson v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 799 F.2d 1, 3-5 (1st Cir. 1986); Welch v. 
Keene Corp., 575 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). 
329. Vasallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 923 (Mass. 1998). 
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Hayes v. Ariens Co.330 was an unlikely case to serve as a con­
duit for true strict liability in Massachusetts. The plaintiff had tried 
to clear out some snow that was clogging the discharge chute of a 
snow blower he was using.331  He had put his hand in the chute 
while the machine was still running, in contravention of a warning 
on the chute, and his fingers came into contact with moving blades 
injuring several of his fingers.332  The plaintiff claimed that the 
warning was inadequate and that the design was defective.333  An 
expert for the plaintiff testified about two alternative designs that 
would have prevented the injury, and which were “economically 
and technologically feasible” at the time the snow blower was 
made.334  On its facts, Hayes did not call for the application of the 
hindsight test, since the fault-based “knew or should have known” 
standard used in negligence law would have allowed the plaintiff to 
prevail on the warning and design claims, provided that his wit­
nesses were believed.  Indeed, the plaintiff contended that the de­
sign of the snow blower did not comply with existing industry 
standards.335  The court was not faced with the real-life implications 
of telling a manufacturer that it should have warned of dangers only 
known in hindsight. 
The hindsight test emerged from this unlikely set of facts be­
cause the jury’s verdicts appeared inconsistent.  On the negligence 
count, the manufacturer and the plaintiff were found 40% and 60% 
responsible, respectively, precluding recovery under the compara­
tive fault statute.336  On the warranty count, the jury found that the 
manufacturer did not breach the implied warranty of 
merchantability.337  Since a finding of negligence meant that the de­
fendant had breached the warranty, the plaintiff claimed that the 
jury should have been told the verdicts were inconsistent and 
should have been told to deliberate further.338  The manufacturer 
attempted to reconcile the verdicts, since they were in its favor, ar­
guing that the finding of the defendant’s negligence must have been 
based on a negligent post-sale failure to warn.339  This would have 
330. Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 273. 
331. Id. at 274. 
332. Id. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. at 275. 
335. Id. at 275-76. 
336. Id. at 274. 
337. Id. 
338. Id. at 274-75. 
339. Id. at 276. 
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jibed with the finding of no breach of warranty, since the breach 
would have occurred, if at all, at the time of sale.340  This was a 
specious argument since the jury had received no instruction on 
post-sale warnings.341 Hayes noted other reasons why the defen­
dant’s post-sale failure to warn theory was flawed and could have 
stopped there to order a new trial.342 
Instead, the court elaborated on warranty liability, invoking 
the Strict Liability Maxim, the 402A Maxim, and the Product, Not 
Conduct Maxim, to give another reason why the jury’s verdicts 
were inconsistent.343 Hayes said that in strict liability, the warning 
is measured by the warning given by a seller who is “fully aware of 
the risks presented by the product.”344  In strict liability, the state of 
industry or scientific knowledge is irrelevant, “as is the culpability 
of the defendant.”345  Accordingly, in a breach of warranty warning 
case, the duty to warn subsumes all of the subsequently-acquired 
knowledge that would underlie a negligent post-sale duty to warn 
claim.346 Hayes did not base the hindsight test on the precedent of 
Massachusetts cases; instead it relied on authority from other juris­
dictions, and it did not even give a polite nod to the long-estab­
lished rule in negligent failure to warn cases that the knowledge of 
risk would not be presumed.347 
The hindsight test was dicta, but there could be little doubt that 
Hayes’ expansive statement about strict liability was an earnestly 
held view about Massachusetts products liability law.  Strict liabil­
ity, it believed, was “imposed as a matter of social policy,”348 echo­
ing the sentiments of Correia, decided just a year before.349 
340. Id. 
341. Id. 
342. Id. at 276-77. 
343. Id. at 277-78. 
344. Id. at 277. 
345. Id. 
346. A post-sale failure to warn claim can be validly asserted when a commercial 
product seller is in a position to provide a warning about a product-related risk after the 
sale of the product, and a reasonable seller, under the circumstances, would provide 
such a warning. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 10 (1998). 
347. Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 277-78 (citing Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 
447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982), as the leading hindsight test decision). Beshada’s holding was 
quickly limited to its facts in Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (N.J. 
1984).  The Supreme Judicial Court had long held that the duty to warn extended only 
to dangers that the defendant knew or should have known. See, e.g., Schaeffer v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (Mass. 1977) (rejecting presumption of knowl­
edge); doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873, 879 n.9 (Mass. 1975). 
348. Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 278. 
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Although it invoked social policy, Hayes did not articulate how the 
hindsight test specifically would further any social policy goal.  In­
stead, the hindsight test was aimed at vindicating the Product, Not 
Conduct Maxim, which held that a breach of warranty claim would 
look at the product only, and not the conduct of the seller. This 
maxim could work in a manufacturing defect case, where the fitness 
of the product could be discerned from examining the product it­
self.  In a warning case, the manufacturer’s sin, if any, was its failure 
to provide instructions, to warn of a risk, to do something.  In short, 
the sin was the manufacturer’s conduct. The hindsight test came 
closest to taking the focus away from the manufacturer’s conduct by 
attempting to make the reasonableness of that conduct 
irrelevant.350 
Despite the relative clarity with which it was announced, the 
hindsight test found few adherents, even among the justices of the 
Supreme Judicial Court which had propounded it. In MacDonald v. 
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., a 1985 warning case decided just a 
year after Hayes, the Supreme Judicial Court grappled with the 
learned intermediary rule for prescription drugs and the adequacy 
of warnings, but it was content to describe the duty to warn for both 
negligence and warranty claims in terms of reasonable care.351 
MacDonald did not take issue with the trial court having treated 
the failure to warn under negligence and warranty as a “single 
claim.”352  Although the issue of the defendant’s knowledge of risk 
was not squarely presented in MacDonald,353 the case was a stark 
example of the harm the hindsight test could cause. The prescrip­
tion drug industry depends on innovation, and the law has tradi­
tionally recognized that the risks of prescription drugs must be 
weighed against the substantial social benefits they provide.354  If 
350. Of course, the Product, Not Conduct Maxim could never be true even with 
the presumption of knowledge, because the adequacy of the warning would still need to 
be judged.  Massachusetts courts have never attempted to impose absolute duties as to 
the adequacy of warnings, since the content of warnings depends so much on the con­
text in which they are given.  Inevitably, the adequacy of warnings must be judged by a 
rule of reason. See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70-71 (Mass. 
1985) (articulating an open-ended reasonableness standard for judging adequacy of 
warnings where “common sense” prevails). 
351. Id. at 70. 
352. Id. at 68. 
353. Id. (noting “narrow issue” presented of whether manufacturer owes duty to 
directly warn patient). 
354. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF  TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965) (limiting liability 
for prescription drugs on account of the social benefits they provide and the risk that 
comes with innovative drugs). 
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manufacturers were held responsible for knowledge acquired years 
later in a rapidly changing field of science, the liability and chilling 
effect on the development of new drugs could be enormous.355 
Federal courts applying Massachusetts law did not recognize 
the hindsight test.  In Anderson v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., the plaintiff 
attempted, on the strength of Hayes, to exclude “state of the art” 
(i.e., the state of scientific knowledge) evidence and to obtain an 
instruction that informed the jury that a product seller is presumed 
to know of all risks of the product.356  The federal district court and 
First Circuit Court of Appeals refused to bar state of the art evi­
dence or to apply the presumption of knowledge, instead holding 
that the seller’s duty to warn is bounded by what it knew or should 
have known about the product’s risks.357 Anderson involved asbes­
tos-containing products, and it was one of thousands of such cases 
against a large number of defendants.358  Because all Massachusetts 
federal court asbestos cases had been consolidated, the disposition 
of the state of the art issue applied to all of those cases.359  The 
stakes were enormous, since the state of the art defense was one of 
the most useful defenses raised by attorneys for asbestos companies 
and because the state of the art issue was vigorously contested.360 
Applying the presumption of knowledge would have greatly tilted 
the odds at trial in favor of plaintiffs.  Unlike in Hayes, where the 
issue was theoretical, applying the hindsight test in asbestos cases 
had real consequences. 
Anderson could not take seriously what Hayes had plainly said, 
predicting that Massachusetts courts would not in fact follow the 
Hayes dicta about the hindsight test.361  Its critique was poignant 
and was proved true, eventually. Anderson pointed out that the 
dangers from the snow blower’s blades were obvious in Hayes, un­
like with asbestos where even experts did not know, at least at some 
points, about the dangers.362  Indeed, the duty to warn was scarcely 
355. See Brown v. Sup. Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 479-80 (Cal. 1988) (rejecting strict liabil­
ity for prescription drugs because it would stifle the development of new drugs and for 
other policy reasons). 
356. Anderson v. Owens–Ill., Inc., 799 F.2d 1, 1-2 (1st Cir. 1986). 
357. Id. at 2-5. 
358. Id. at 1 & n.1; John H. Kennedy, Asbestos Consolidation Wins Mixed Re­
views, BOSTON GLOBE, July 31, 1991, at 49 (noting 2800 federal court cases then pend­
ing in Massachusetts). 
359. Anderson, 799 F.2d at 1 & n.1. 
360. See Gideon Mark, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 885­
89 (1983). 
361. Anderson, 799 F.2d at 3-4. 
362. Id. at 3. 
50 
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contested in Hayes, since the manufacturer had in fact provided a 
warning.363 Anderson took aim at the foundations of the hindsight 
test, pointing out that imposing the presumption of knowledge 
could not improve the real world behavior of product manufactur­
ers and sellers, since a warning that the product may pose unknown 
dangers is no warning at all.364 
This, after all, was the telling blow against the hindsight test; it 
could not be tied to making products safer and preventing injuries 
in the first place.  While the hindsight test could unquestionably aid 
in the compensation of injured product users, where would those 
compensation funds come from?  The loss-spreading rationale rec­
ognized in section 402A and the early strict liability cases, involving 
manufacturing defects only had force if those losses could be in­
sured against (either by the manufacturer itself or through a policy 
with an insurance company), which required some knowledge of 
the risk.  Insuring against the rare soda bottle that makes it through 
quality control is one thing, insuring against generic risks that might 
become known decades later is something else entirely. Anderson 
refused to force product manufacturers to buy insurance on a 
“blind basis.”365 
Anderson, despite its rejection of the hindsight test, did stake 
out something of a middle ground between the “knew or should 
have known” standard from negligence theory, and the presump­
tion of knowledge that Hayes had appended to warranty law.366  In 
Anderson, the charge to the jury, affirmed by the First Circuit, held 
the defendants to the knowledge of experts in the industry “or in 
view of the state of medical and scientific knowledge in general.”367 
This expert standard increased the duty of product sellers to dis­
cover risks about their products.368  Previously, the seller was sim­
ply held to the standard of an “ordinary, reasonably prudent 
manufacturer in like circumstances.”369  This rule made the burden 
on product sellers more onerous, but it was a rule that they could 
theoretically comply with.  Although the expert standard was prob­
ably more a refinement of the negligence duty of reasonable care 
363. Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Mass. 1984), abrogated by Vas­
sallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998). 
364. Anderson, 799 F.2d at 4. 
365. Id. at 5. 
366. Id. at 4 (noting expert knowledge standard is higher than negligence stan­
dard). 
367. Id. at 2. 
368. Id. at 4. 
369. Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 971 (Mass. 1978). 
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under the circumstances, it provided a convenient way for Ander­
son and other courts, to maintain the supposedly clear distinction 
between warranty and negligence, and thereby not run headlong 
into the three Maxims, which Massachusetts courts held dear.370 
The expert rule would prove influential once the hindsight rule was 
abolished.371 
While federal courts in Massachusetts followed Anderson,372 
Massachusetts state courts were not following the hindsight test ei­
ther.  In Welch v. Keene Corp., another personal injury asbestos 
case, the appeals court described the duty to warn in traditional 
negligence terms for a warranty claim.373 Welch cited Hayes for 
another point of law, and then cited Anderson for the proposition 
that the duty to warn only extends to dangers that are known or 
reasonably knowable.374 Welch did not even bother to acknowl­
edge the hindsight test, or attempt to reconcile Hayes with 
Anderson.375 
In light of what might be called obtuseness, or perhaps rebel­
lion, against the hindsight test, the Supreme Judicial Court tried in 
the 1992 decision of Simmons v. Monarch Machine Tool Co., to 
bring these errant courts back into line by reaffirming its support 
for the hindsight test.376 Simmons observed quite correctly that the 
Hayes dicta was a clear statement of Massachusetts law.377 Sim­
mons’ admonition was also dicta, and so the hindsight test had still 
not been applied where the imputation of knowledge could have 
actual effect.378 
370. In Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., the First Circuit took pains to note that sec­
tion 402A imposes a duty higher than due care due to the expert standard before com­
ing to the conclusion that in failure to warn cases negligence and warranty were quite 
similar.  Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1231-33 (1st Cir. 1990) (judgment 
vacated on federal preemption grounds unrelated to holdings on Massachusetts tort 
law), vacated on other grounds, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), remanded to 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 
1992); see also supra Part I.D.4 (discussing the three Maxims). 
371. See infra Part III.A. 
372. See Kotler, 926 F.2d at 1231-33; Wasylow v. Glock, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 370, 378 
(D. Mass. 1996); Collins v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 629 F. Supp. 540, 543 (D. Mass. 1986) 
(following Anderson’s trial court decision rejecting Hayes’ dictum). 
373. Welch v. Keene Corp., 575 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). 
374. Id. at 770. 
375. Id. 
376. Simmons v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 596 N.E.2d 318, 320 n.3 (Mass. 1992), 
abrogated by Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998). 
377. Id. 
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The next year, the Massachusetts Appeals Court suggested that 
the viability of the Hayes dicta was still an open question, despite 
the statement in Simmons, but the appeals court did not reach the 
issue because the plaintiff had not objected to the introduction of 
state of the art evidence at trial.379  Two years later, a federal court 
stated that the duty to warn extended to dangers the manufacturer 
“knows or should know,” again without acknowledging Hayes or 
the hindsight test.380 
By the time Simmons renewed vows with the hindsight test in 
1992, the nominal state of products liability law in Massachusetts 
differed greatly from the actual state of affairs in failure to warn 
cases. Hayes had given Massachusetts a revolution in products lia­
bility law and nobody came.  The federal courts were not following 
two clearly written decisions by Massachusetts’ highest court, a 
court they were bound to follow on matters of state law. The hind­
sight test seemed like it might be a dead letter in state courts as 
well.  In the City of Boston asbestos case, a massive litigation in 
state court involving thousands of pages of testimony, hundreds of 
exhibits, forty-five days of trial, and presumably very able counsel, 
neither side ever took the position that state of the art evidence was 
irrelevant,381 despite Hayes’ statement that “[t]he state of the art is 
irrelevant.”382  It was difficult to predict what a Massachusetts trial 
court might do in a failure to warn case. Would it follow the dicta 
in Hayes and Simmons, or would it follow the better reasoned deci­
sions of the First Circuit?  This was not an academic question, espe­
cially in asbestos cases like Anderson, Welch, or City of Boston, 
where the difference between what was known about asbestos in 
the 1980s and 1990s was markedly different from what was known 
decades earlier when some of the asbestos workers had been ex­
posed.383  This ambiguity on a question so important cried out for 
resolution, and the Supreme Judicial Court did resolve it in 1998, in 
the final part of the modern era of Massachusetts products liability 
law. 
379. City of Boston v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 638 N.E.2d 1387, 1393 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1994). 
380. Wasylow v. Glock, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 370, 378 (D. Mass. 1996). 
381. U.S. Gypsum Co., 638 N.E.2d at 1388, 1393. 
382. Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Mass. 1984), abrogated by Vas­
sallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998). 
383. See Alex J. Grant, Note, When Does the Clock Start Ticking?: Applying the 
Statute of Limitations in Asbestos Property Damage Actions, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 
701-03 (1995); Mark, supra note 360, at 885-89. 
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C.	 The Uncertainty About the Reasonable Alternative Design 
Requirement Grows 
The question of whether to require the plaintiff to show an al­
ternative design that is arguably safer than an allegedly defective 
design has been the single most contentious products liability issue 
in the last twenty-five years.384  During the six years (1992 to 1998) 
the new Restatement was being drafted, debate centered on that 
very subject in a project that canvassed all of the major tort issues 
in products liability law.385  The new Restatement’s ultimate deci­
sion to explicitly require a showing of a reasonable alternative de­
sign as part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case is what made the new 
Restatement controversial, with charges that the document had 
taken a decidedly pro-defendant slant.386  By contrast, the debate 
over the hindsight test, which could easily be framed in terms of 
whether a court was being sufficiently faithful to the concept of 
strict liability, has proven to be a somewhat one-sided affair, as it 
became quickly apparent during the 1980s that decisions like Hayes 
in Massachusetts and Beshada in New Jersey were outliers.387  Al­
though the reasonable alternative design requirement does not fit 
neatly within the strict liability/negligence divide that has preoccu­
pied courts, commentators, and practitioners in Massachusetts and 
elsewhere, it is of fundamental importance because it significantly 
increases the plaintiff’s burden of making a viable claim, and be­
cause of its potential widespread impact on consumer choice and 
the American marketplace.388  All of this is to say that the issue of 
whether a reasonable alternative design was a non-essential factor 
in the judicial review of product designs, or whether it was, in fact, a 
requirement, was no idle question during the middle part of the 
modern era of Massachusetts products liability law from 1983 to 
1992.389  And yet, Massachusetts state courts refrained from resolv­
ing it, continuing to suggest that it was just a factor but never saying 
384.	 Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 123, at 1062-63. R 
385. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF  TORTS: PROD. LIAB. introductory cmt. 
(1998). 
386. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The 
American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 
90-93 (2002). 
387.	 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 Reporters’ Note. 
388.	 See Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 123, at 1069-70. 
389. See id. at 1062-64 (describing controversy over reasonable alternative design 
requirement). 
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so explicitly.390  The First Circuit took up the issue in 1990, and held 
explicitly that a reasonable alternative design is required in Massa­
chusetts,391 and that has continued to be the law, at least in federal 
court, to the present day.392  This led to another federal/state dis­
parity on an important issue where state court decisions are sup­
posed to be controlling.393  It was another muddled area of 
Massachusetts products liability law to emerge during this middle 
period. 
As discussed earlier, Back had in 1978 set forth risk-utility fac­
tors for reviewing the conscious design choices of manufacturers.394 
It was a good start on the construction of a modern products liabil­
ity law, and the question of whether a safer alternative design was 
required had not presented itself.  In Back, the plaintiff had 
presented persuasive proof that specific aspects of the design of a 
motor home contributed to making it unnecessarily dangerous in 
the event of a crash.395  The plaintiff’s expert presented evidence of 
alternative designs, which experts for defendants disputed, but that 
disagreement was one for the finder of fact to resolve.396  The plain­
tiff’s theory of defect centered around its evidence of design im­
provements, and three of the five enumerated factors related to the 
alternative design.397  Subsequent cases used the same Back factors 
and those cases too involved plaintiffs assailing the design choices 
of manufacturers by proposing marginal improvements to the de­
sign that were technologically and economically feasible.398 
Whether the alternative designs were feasible or not, whether they 
were safer or not, or whether they would have prevented the plain­
tiff’s injuries or not, were all matters for the finder of fact to decide, 
but that was the battleground upon which the litigants fought.399 
By making the Back factors non-exclusive and by making none 
of them essential, Massachusetts courts had invited plaintiffs to 
make design claims based on the overall risks and utilities of prod­
390. Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1310-11 (Mass. 1988) (setting 
forth design defect factors, but not stating clearly whether alternative design is 
required). 
391. Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated on 
other grounds, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), remanded to 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992). 
392. Gillespie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 386 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2004). 
393. Compare Colter, 525 N.E.2d at 1310-11 with Kotler, 926 F.2d at 1225. 
394. See supra Part I.D.1. 
395. Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 967-68 (Mass. 1978). 
396. Id. 
397. Id. 
398. See, e.g., Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978). 
399. Id. 
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ucts, without proof of a safer alternative design.400  An open-ended 
risk-utility test meant that costs and benefits could be weighed with 
respect to competing designs of the product, or could be weighed 
with respect to the product itself.401  In the latter case, plaintiffs 
would ask the jury to find that the product’s dangers outweighed its 
utility.402 
The difference between these two inquiries might have seemed 
obscure at the time the risk-utility factors were formulated by 
courts across the United States in the 1970s, but a 1983 decision of 
the New Jersey Supreme Court made it clear that the difference 
was fundamental.  In O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., the plaintiff had 
dived into an aboveground swimming pool and had suffered serious 
injuries when his head struck the bottom.403  The plaintiff argued 
that the vinyl bottom of the pool was too slippery, preventing him 
from using his outstretched hands to brace himself before his head 
hit the bottom.404  The plaintiff could not point to alternative mate­
rial that would have made the bottom less slippery, so his claim was 
reduced to the proposition that the manufacturer should not have 
sold aboveground swimming pools because the pools were too dan­
gerous.405  The New Jersey Supreme Court essentially accepted this 
argument and held that a jury question existed on whether “the 
risks of injury so outweighed the utility of the product as to consti­
tute a defect.”406  With O’Brien, the issue of whether it was appro­
priate for courts to engage in this kind of broad-based risk-utility 
balancing was joined.407  Other jurisdictions began to accept this 
theory in the 1980s.408  Massachusetts courts remained silent on the 
question. 
400. Id. at 1191-93. 
401. Id. 
402. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e (1998) (prod­
uct’s risks and utilities compared to determine whether it is manifestly unreasonable 
design). 
403. O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 302 (N.J. 1983), superseded by stat­
ute, N.J.S.A. 2A: 58C-3 (1987), as recognized in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990). 
404. Id. at 302-03. 
405. Id. 
406. Id. at 306. 
407. See, e.g., Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 114 (La. 
1986), superseded by statute, Louisiana Products Liability Act, Acts of 1988, N. 64, as 
recognized in Fredrick v. Gen. Motors Corp., 544 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 1989) (adopting 
broad-based risk-utility balancing similar to O’Brien). 
408. See id. at 114; Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1158-59 (Md. 1985) 
(allowing imposition of liability on theory that the dangers of a type of cheap handgun 
56 
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In Kotler v. American Tobacco Co.,409 the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals was faced with a design defect claim with no claim that a 
safer alternative design existed.  Instead, the plaintiff argued that 
the inherent risks of smoking cigarettes outweighed cigarettes’ 
overall social utility.410 Kotler canvassed Massachusetts products li­
ability decisions and could find no instance of liability being im­
posed in a design case without evidence that a “different, arguably 
safer, alternative design was possible.”411  It then maintained that a 
“safer alternative design is a sine qua non for the imposition of lia­
bility,” citing Uloth and Colter.412  As this Article has previously 
discussed, Uloth did hint at the essential nature of an alternative 
design: “there is a case for the jury if the plaintiff can show an avail­
able design modification which would reduce the risk without un­
due cost or interference with the performance of the machinery.”413 
Colter repeated the same language, citing Uloth.414 Kotler had am­
ple authority to reject a design claim on the theory that all ciga­
rettes were inherently defective and unreasonably dangerous, not 
the least of which being comment i of section 402A of the second 
Restatement, which rejected liability for “good tobacco.”415  How­
ever, Kotler overread Uloth and Colter because those cases did not 
say that a safer alternative design was required. 
Uloth and Colter stated that there was a case for the jury if 
such proof was presented; they did not explicitly say that the jury 
could not consider a design claim without such proof.416  Moreover, 
Colter, Correia, and Hayes had also stated that “a defendant may 
be liable on a theory of breach of warranty of merchantability even 
though he or she properly designed, manufactured, and sold his or 
her product,” on the theory that strict liability did not require proof 
outweigh its benefits), superseded in part by statute, MD. CODE art. 27 § 36-1, as recog­
nized in Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1156 (Md. 2002). 
409. Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated on other 
grounds, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), remanded to 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992). 
410. Id. at 1225. 
411. Id. 
412. Id. (citing Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1310-11 (Mass. 
1988); Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1193 (Mass. 1978)). 
413. See Uloth, 384 N.E.2d. at 1193; supra notes 144-149. 
414. Colter, 525 N.E.2d at 1310-11. 
415. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF  TORTS § 402A cmt. I (1965) (“good tobacco” 
not unreasonably dangerous). 
416. Colter, 525 N.E.2d at 1310-11; Uloth, 384 N.E.2d at 1193. 
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of the defendant’s misconduct.417  This reference to “properly de­
signed” could have been interpreted as holding open the possibility 
of liability where there was no quarrel with the configuration of the 
product, but where the inherent risks were assailed. That language, 
purportedly derived from comment a of section 402A, was impre­
cise and unwisely formulated.  As this Article has contended, sec­
tion 402A was primarily concerned with imposing strict liability for 
manufacturing defects.  When comment a spoke of liability even 
where the defendant “has exercised all possible care in the prepara­
tion and sale of the product,”418 it was contemplating the odd lot 
(i.e., a small crack in a soda bottle) that had slipped through the 
manufacturer’s quality control process.  Comment a said nothing of 
“proper designs,” but strict liability under section 402A would in­
deed attach for a manufacturing defect in a properly designed prod­
uct.  The problem for the First Circuit was that Massachusetts 
courts had no shared understanding that the concept of “strict lia­
bility” was limited to manufacturing defects. Colter and Hayes, af­
ter all, were design cases and they contained florid strict liability 
language.419 
Kotler did not deal with the inconvenient “properly designed” 
language, nor did it address the fact that the Back factors were 
presented as points for a court to consider, among other factors.420 
There had been no attempt to assign importance or priority to the 
factors, so it was a stretch, based on the cases decided prior to 
Kotler, to find that the reasonable alternative design requirement 
was a settled issue. Smith v. Ariens Co., decided the same day as 
Back, saw no problem with extending design defect liability on a 
theory that lacked any specific alternative design.421  In reality, 
Kotler was making a prediction of how a Massachusetts state court 
would handle a case premised upon the inherent dangers of a prod­
uct, rather than applying well-established law.  Such a case, like 
Kotler, would hold vast implications for the American economy if 
widely-used products like cigarettes or aboveground swimming 
pools could be condemned on a categorical basis.422  But the picture 
417. Colter, 525 N.E.2d at 1313 (citing Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 279 
(Mass. 1984), abrogated by Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 
1998); Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1044 (Mass. 1983)). 
418. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a. 
419. Colter, 525 N.E.2d at 1313; Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 277-78. 
420. See Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978) (jury should 
consider enumerated factors “among other factors”). 
421. Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 957-58 (Mass. 1978). 
422. See Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 123, at 1069-70. R 
58 
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was still fuzzy for anyone having a stake in Massachusetts products 
liability law.  Arrayed against the holding of Kotler was a great deal 
of language from Massachusetts courts that made this kind of cate­
gorical liability possible.423 Kotler was another instance of a federal 
court getting ahead of Massachusetts courts in formulating state 
products liability law, as the First Circuit had done in rejecting the 
hindsight test in Anderson. 
III.	 THE UNFINISHED AND UNCERTAIN REDEFINITION OF 
STRICT LIABILITY: 1998 TO PRESENT 
As the new millennium approached, the strict liability wave 
had crested in other American jurisdictions, and the continuous ex­
pansion of liability since the fall of the privity rule had stopped.424 
In 1998, the final version of the Restatement was published, and it 
was a substantial rethinking of section 402A.425  It was not surpris­
ing then that in 1998, Massachusetts courts began to rethink some 
prior decisions and to redefine, at least in some areas, the notion of 
strict liability and the duties imposed by the implied warranty of 
merchantability. 
A. The End of the Hindsight Test 
In 1998, the Supreme Judicial Court chose to abolish the hind­
sight test, appropriately enough, when it did not matter.  In Vassallo 
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., the plaintiff was a woman whose sili­
cone breast implants had failed.426  One had ruptured and the other 
had holes through which silicone gel could leak.427  The failure of 
the implants had caused scarring, autoimmune disease, pain and 
suffering, and surgery to remove the medical devices.428  The plain­
tiff claimed that the manufacturer of the implants had negligently 
failed to provide adequate warnings, had negligently designed the 
product, and had breached the implied warranty of 
merchantability.429 
On the negligent failure to warn claim, the plaintiff introduced 
evidence which showed that the manufacturer knew, prior to the 
423. See Back, 378 N.E.2d at 970 (alternative design just a factor jury could 
consider). 
424. Owen, supra note 97, at 978-79. 
425. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. introduction (1998). 
426. Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998). 
427. Id. at 912-13. 
428. Id. 
429. Id. at 912. 
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sale, that the implants were subject to rupture and that silicone gel 
could escape, migrate though the patient’s body, and cause 
problems with the body’s immune system.430  The warnings pro­
vided to doctors addressed some of the research studies concerning 
silicone implants, but they did not give notice of all of the risks.431 
At trial, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on the negli­
gence and breach of warranty claims.432  On appeal, the Supreme 
Judicial Court upheld the plaintiff’s verdict on the negligence count, 
and therefore found it unnecessary to address the warranty 
count.433  The court took the opportunity however to address the 
defendants’ argument that the hindsight test should be abolished 
and replaced with a standard requiring actual or constructive 
knowledge of the product’s risks.434 
Vassallo agreed that it was time to end Massachusetts’ experi­
ment with the hindsight test for warranty claims in warning cases; a 
decision that had no effect in Vassallo but would apply in future 
litigation.435  The trial judge had, despite the open rebellion against 
the hindsight test, given the presumption of knowledge instruction 
over the defendants’ objection.436  On the facts, such an instruction 
was unnecessary for plaintiff to prevail since there was substantial 
proof that the manufacturer did in fact know about the risk that 
eventually felled Florence Vassallo.437  The court noted that the in­
struction was a “correct statement” of [the] law,” but it also recog­
nized that Massachusetts was one of only four states to apply the 
hindsight test.438  New Jersey’s law, which Hayes had found to be 
persuasive support for the hindsight test in 1984, had changed.439 
Vassallo also acknowledged that the presumption of knowledge was 
not popular among scholars, and the test had “not been uniformly 
applied [in] Massachusetts State and Federal courts,”440 an under­
statement to be sure. 
430. Id. at 913-15. 
431. Id. at 915. 
432. Id. at 912. 
433. Id. at 921-22. 
434. Id. 
435. Id. at 922. 
436. Id. at 922-23. 
437. Id. at 921. 
438. Id. at 922. 
439. Id.; Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273 (Mass. 1984), abrogated by Vassallo 
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998). 
440. Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d at 922-23. 
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Vassallo did more than acknowledge the obvious, which was 
that the hindsight approach had little judicial support inside and 
outside of Massachusetts, that academics were against it, and that 
the court had rejected it. Vassallo stepped away from the strict lia­
bility rhetoric and the easy incantation of the three Maxims.  Al­
though the court repeated the 402A Maxim,441 its analysis was 
rooted in functional policy concerns, rather a desire to square the 
result with notions of “strict liability.”442  Gone was the juxtaposi­
tion of the “special responsibilities” of deep-pocketed product man­
ufacturers and the rights and entitlements of the consumer.443 
Gone was the problematic risk-spreading rationale, which Ander­
son had dismantled effectively.444  In its place was a desire “to in­
duce conduct that is capable of being performed,” a policy not 
advanced by requiring warnings of unknowable risks.445  Leaning 
heavily on the new Restatement, which had noted “that 
[u]nforeseeable risks . . . by definition cannot specifically be warned 
against,”446 Vassallo made the primary behavior of product manu­
facturers and sellers the chief concern of Massachusetts products 
liability law by concentrating on how best to incentivize them to 
achieve an optimal level of product safety, and by recognizing the 
limits of the judicial system to do so.447  Compensation to injured 
users, by easing their burden of proof, was less important. The au­
thority of the new Restatement was obviously important in the de­
cision to reverse precedent, as was the fact that comment j of 
section 402A had also used the “knew or should have known” 
standard.448 
Vassallo adopted the expert standard endorsed by Anderson, 
and it emphasized that a manufacturer would retain a continuing 
duty to give warnings (at least to purchasers) of risks discovered 
after the sale.449  As a result, Massachusetts law would continue to 
recognize duties unknown to negligence theory in the pre-modern 
441. Id. at 923. 
442. Id. at 922-23 (explaining how liability standard should induce product sellers 
to give better warnings). 
443. Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Mass. 1983). 
444. Anderson v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 799 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1986). 
445. Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d at 922-23. 
446. Id. at 923. 
447. Id. at 909. 
448. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF  TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965) (“[T]he seller is 
required to give warning against [the risk], if he has knowledge, or by the application of 
reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of the pres­
ence of the ingredient and the danger.”). 
449. Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d at 924. 
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era. Vassallo’s endorsement of the new Restatement seemed to sig­
nal a new way of thinking about Massachusetts products liability 
law, but it had not replaced section 402A, which remained the offi­
cial source of doctrine.  In 1999, one of the attorneys representing a 
trade group for Massachusetts businesses who had submitted an 
amicus brief in Vassallo, suggested in an Article that Vassallo rep­
resented “the merger of negligence and warranty theories in” de­
sign and warning cases.450  This merger, i.e., the end of strict 
liability except for manufacturing defects, he argued, should be 
completed by submitting design and warning claims under a single 
theory to juries, rather than separately under negligence and war­
ranty, and by applying the comparative negligence statute to all de­
sign and warning claims.451  If that course had been taken, the Strict 
Liability Maxim, the 402A Maxim, and the Product, Not Conduct 
Maxim would have all been discarded in favor of a more enlight­
ened and less ideological approach. This has not happened. Vas­
sallo presented an opportunity to not only do away with the 
hindsight test, but also to affect a doctrinal rethinking and to an­
nounce a new theoretical basis for Massachusetts products liability 
law.  That moment passed, and Vassallo now just represents a sig­
nificant addition to the canon of Massachusetts products liability 
cases; it did not fully break free from the strict liability baggage, and 
it did not represent a full-scale reversion to negligence theory, as 
the defense bar would no doubt favor. 
B. Retention of the Strangely Orthodox Post-Sale Duty to Warn 
During the modern era of Massachusetts products liability law, 
courts have been wary of expanding the duty to give warnings to 
users after the product has been sold.452  While such a duty creates 
the prospect of a never-ending, open-ended potential liability, it 
also could prevent injuries and save lives.453  Balancing those com­
peting policy concerns is a line-drawing exercise, and it invites the 
application of a flexible rule of reason that takes into account the 
450. See David R. Geiger & Stephanie C. Martinez, Design and Warning Defect 
Claims under Massachusetts Product Liability Law: Completing the Merger of Negli­
gence and Warranty, 43 BOSTON B. J. 12, 12 (1999). 
451. See id. at 27. 
452. See Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Mass. 1984) (explaining limits 
of post-sale duty to warn), abrogated by Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d 909. 
453. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 10 cmt. a (1998); Kenneth 
Ross & J. David Prince, Post-Sale Duties: The Most Expansive Theory in Products Lia­
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costs and benefits of recognizing a post-sale duty to warn in particu­
lar circumstances.  Since the 1970s, Massachusetts has recognized a 
limited post-sale duty to warn of product dangers.454  On the other 
hand, giving notice of safety improvements for products that were 
reasonably safe at the time they were manufactured has simply not 
been required.455  This no-duty rule is a reminder of the inflexible, 
wooden rules that unnaturally hampered recovery in the pre-mod­
ern era, like the privity rule or the patent danger rule.456  After Vas­
sallo, which explicitly recognized a post-sale duty to warn for at 
least direct purchasers and which embraced a negligence-style rea­
sonable care standard,457 it might have been expected that the post-
sale duty to warn would be shorn of this particular no-duty rule. 
Although there has been some perception that the post-sale 
duty to warn is of recent vintage,458 it has existed throughout the 
modern era.  In 1975, doCanto v. Ametek, Inc. held that a manufac­
turer owed a post-sale duty to warn of design changes and improve­
ments that would eliminate the risk from a negligent design.459  This 
duty was carefully framed as one that arose from “the manufac­
turer’s initial fault” in selling a product that contained a design de­
fect, i.e., lacking a safety feature that was feasible at the time of 
sale.460 doCanto also noted that the product had also been misrep­
resented, which aggravated the manufacturer’s original failure to 
design the product safely enough.461  Thus, the post-sale duty to 
warn could be understood as an obligation to ameliorate risk 
caused by one’s own negligent behavior.462  Having established that 
limitation, doCanto opened the door a bit wider by suggesting that 
454. doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873, 878-79 (Mass. 1975). 
455. Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 276. 
456. See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 190, at 483; Aaron D. Twerski, R 
Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: 
Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521, 524 
(1982) (discussing demise of single factor no-duty rules); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a (1998) (noting the erosion of restrictive rules which made 
recovery difficult in design and warning cases). 
457. Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 923-24 (Mass. 1998) 
(noting manufacturer remains subject to continuing duty to warn while rejecting pre­
sumption of knowledge if failure to warn cases). 
458. Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862, 865 n.7 (Mass. 2001). The trial court in 
Lewis v. Ariens Co. found the timing of Vassallo’s recognition of a post-sale duty to 
warn to be crucial in resolving that issue, apparently believing that Vassallo had created 
the basis for a new theory of liability. Id. 
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“there may be a duty to give reasonable warning of a product’s dan­
gers which are discovered after the sale.”463 
This uncertain extension was made clearer in 1984, when 
Hayes v. Ariens Co. said that the duty to warn of subsequently dis­
covered risks did exist for “properly designed” products.464 Hayes 
was quick to say, however, that the duty to give notice of design 
improvements only applied to products that were defectively de­
signed at the time of sale, and that the post-sale duty to warn had 
never been recognized as extending to remote purchasers (i.e., be­
yond the consumer buying the product new).465  After Hayes, there 
was a delineation between the post-sale duty to warn of a product’s 
inherent risks, and the post-sale duty to warn of safety improve­
ments that would reduce risk; the former duty extended to all prod­
ucts, and the latter duty extended to negligently designed 
products.466 
Massachusetts courts generally did not attempt to justify the 
distinction, beyond noting the extent to which prior decisions had, 
and had not, recognized a post-sale duty to warn.467 Williams v. 
Monarch Machine Tool Co. Inc.468 and City of Boston v. United 
States Gypsum Co.469 were able, in almost ipse dixit470 fashion, to 
dispatch arguments that the duty to warn of safety improvements 
should be extended to products that had not been deemed defec­
tively designed at the time of sale.471  The harshness of this rule 
could be seen in Williams, in which a worker was injured by an 
463. Id. at 879 n.9. 
464. Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Mass. 1984), abrogated by Vas­
sallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998). 
465. Id. 
466. doCanto, 328 N.E.2d at 878-79; Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 276. 
467. Hayes, 462 N.E.2d at 276 (“[W]e have never said, that a manufacturer has a 
duty to advise purchasers about post-sale safety improvements that have been made to 
a machine that was reasonably safe at the time of sale.”). 
468. Williams v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 26 F.3d 228, 232-33 (1st Cir. 1994). 
469. City of Boston v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 638 N.E.2d 1387, 1393-94 (Mass. App. 
1994). 
470. Ipse Dixit means “something asserted but not proved.” BLACK’S LAW DIC­
TIONARY 905 (9th ed. 2009). 
471. See also Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001).  In 
Cigna, the First Circuit again noted that the post-sale duty to warn of design improve­
ments was limited to negligently designed products, but there the plaintiff had con­
vinced a jury on sufficient evidence that a sauna heater contained a design defect at the 
time it was made. Id. at 12-13.  As a result, the manufacturer had a post-sale duty to 
give notice of safety improvements instituted just a year or two after the sale. Id. at 13­
14. 
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industrial machine that lacked a certain safety guard.472  There was 
evidence that a safety guard had been developed by the defendant 
itself after the machine had been manufactured, but before the acci­
dent.473  During this interim period, the defendant manufacturer 
serviced the machine and was aware that the machine lacked the 
guard.474  The jury, considering the state of technology existing at 
the time of sale, found no design defect.475  The jury may well have 
found, had it been given the opportunity, that giving notice of the 
subsequently developed guard was feasible and in keeping with a 
duty of reasonable care under the circumstances, especially since 
the design improvement had occurred shortly after the sale and was 
quickly adopted.476  In any event, the failure to give a post-sale 
warning helped lead to a severe injury that could have been easily 
prevented.477 
Lewis v. Ariens Co.478 was the first significant post-sale duty to 
warn case subsequent to Vassallo, giving the Supreme Judicial 
Court a chance in 2001 to elaborate on the Massachusetts post-sale 
duty to warn in light of the Restatement. Vassallo had used the new 
Restatement as support to abolish the hindsight test.479  The new 
Restatement also recognized a post-sale duty to warn that differed 
from the Massachusetts rule.480  The plaintiff in Lewis urged the 
court to adopt explicitly the new Restatement’s post-sale warning 
standard, which the court was willing to do, calling it “a natural 
extension” of the ruling in Vassallo.481  Section 10 of the new Re­
statement is essentially a reasonable care standard that qualifies the 
post-sale duty to warn in important ways that distinguish it from the 
more open-ended duty to warn of a product’s risk at the time of the 





477. Id. at 229 (new shielding equipment had been available for ten years at time 
of accident).  The First Circuit in Williams explained that its unwillingness to expand 
the post-sale duty to warn stemmed from the limits of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 232. 
It lectured that “litigants who reject a state forum in order to bring suit in federal diver­
sity jurisdictions cannot expect that new trails will be blazed.” Id.  Of course, after the 
First Circuit’s virtual rebellion against the hindsight test in Anderson v. Owens-Illinois, 
Inc., 799 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986), such reticence was, to say the least, selective. See supra 
Part II.B. 
478. Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. 2001). 
479. Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 923-24 (Mass. 1998). 
480. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 10 (1998). 
481. Lewis, 751 N.E.2d at 866-67. 
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original sale.482  Section 10 is limited to “substantial” risks of harm; 
it is also limited to situations where the users can be identified and 
the warning can be effectively communicated to those users.483  Fi­
nally, manufacturers may escape the post-sale duty to warn if the 
burden (i.e., cost) is “sufficiently great” in relation to the risk of 
harm.484  The new Restatement also envisions that trial courts will 
actively screen post-sale duty to warn claims before submitting 
them to juries.485  By adopting section 10, Lewis was adopting a 
standard that carefully calibrated the responsibilities of manufac­
turers to provide ongoing warnings; it was not a bold step.  On its 
essential points, Lewis was mostly a refinement of previously-ex­
isting principles.486  On its facts, Lewis held that there was no post-
sale duty to warn owed to a person who had purchased a second­
hand snow blower some sixteen years after the original sale.487 
Under those circumstances, the second-hand purchaser was part of 
a universe of users too difficult to identify, a holding fully consistent 
with the long-held reluctance to require post-sale warnings to “re­
mote purchasers.”488 
Despite engaging in some lengthy deliberation in whether to 
make this section of the new Restatement part of Massachusetts 
law, Lewis failed to address the one aspect of the existing Massa­
chusetts rule that differed from section 10.  Section 10, like the law 
of many jurisdictions, “does not draw a sharp distinction between 
failure to warn of risk and failure to warn of safety improve­
ments.”489  The dichotomy in Massachusetts law between warning 
of risks and warning of risk-avoidance measures is missing from the 
new Restatement.490  One would have expected that adopting a 
provision of the new Restatement would have been done for the 
purpose of changing Massachusetts law in areas that differ from the 
Restatement.  Otherwise, there is little point in the exercise. Yet, 
Lewis can only be read to affirm the rule limiting the post-sale duty 
482. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 10 (1998). 
483. Id. § 10(b)(1)-(3). 
484. Id. § 10(b)(4). 
485. Id. § 10 cmt. a. 
486. See Kalsow v. Shaughnessy Crane Service, Inc., No. 06-P-1565, 2007 WL 
4441080 (Mass. App. Ct. Dec. 19, 2007) (“Lewis did not establish a new principle, but 
clarified the interpretation of existing law.”). 
487. Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862, 867-68 (Mass. 2001). 
488. Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Mass. 1984), abrogated by Vas­
sallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998). 
489. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD.  LIAB. § 10 Reporters’ Note. 
490. Id. 
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to warn of safety improvements, since it noted that Vassallo had 
done nothing to change the rule, and Lewis did nothing to upset the 
status quo.491  Perhaps Lewis did not realize this difference between 
Massachusetts law and the new Restatement, since it appeared to 
accept section 10 without reservation.492 
Lewis and subsequent decisions have shown that establishing 
the feasibility of giving post-sale warnings will continue to be the 
most significant hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome.493  With the pas­
sage of time, the already tenuous links between the manufacturer 
or retail seller and the consumer vanish.494  When a snow blower is 
re-sold informally as in Lewis,495 or when a piece of construction 
equipment is re-sold on three different occasions over thirty 
years,496 the ability of a manufacturer or a seller to deliver a mean­
ingful warning is virtually non-existent.  As a result, the scope of the 
post-sale duty to warn is hardly poised to spiral out of control under 
the new Restatement.  In fact, it may turn out that the economic 
and practical feasibility of giving post-sale warnings becomes an ad­
ded limitation on the duty to warn where the manufacturer’s “initial 
fault” had led to a design defect.  Massachusetts law prior to the 
new Restatement did not recognize such a limitation where “initial 
fault” had been established.497  The new Restatement should be 
used to expand the post-sale duty to warn to situations in which a 
post-sale warning about design improvements can be done with lit­
tle effort or little cost.  This can often be done where the seller and 
purchaser have an ongoing relationship.  There is no good reason 
for Massachusetts to hew to its no-duty rule with respect to safety 
improvements when the scope of the post-sale duty to warn has al­
ready been judiciously managed.498 
491. Lewis, 751 N.E.2d at 865. 
492. Id. at 866-67. 
493. See, e.g., Robinson v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 500 F.3d 691, 697-98 (8th Cir. 
2007) (no duty to warn remote user, citing Lewis). 
494. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 10 cmt. e (explaining 
how lack of customer records make it difficult to identify users). 
495. Lewis, 751 N.E.2d at 863. 
496. Hanlan v. Chandler, No. 4-0259B, 2008 WL 5608253, at *3 (Mass. Super. 
Nov. 13, 2008) (entering summary judgment for a product manufacturer on a post-sale 
warning claim because the duty to warn did not extend to remote purchasers). 
497. See doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873, 878 (Mass. 1975) (postsale 
warnings reasonable step to eliminate risk created by manufacturer’s “initial fault”); 
City of Boston v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 638 N.E.2d 1387, 1393-94 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (no 
post-sale duty to warn where product is reasonably safe at time of sale). 
498. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 10 Reporters’ Note (“It is 
clear that in most cases it will be difficult to establish each of the four § 10 factors that 
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C.	 Correia, Unreasonable Use, and the Conundrum of Strict 
Liability Live On 
The judicially-created “unreasonable use” defense recognized 
in Correia was put to a stern test in 2006 when the Supreme Judicial 
Court was called upon to apply it to cigarettes. The important role 
of Correia in Massachusetts products liability litigation was re­
vealed in Haglund v. Philip Morris, Inc. when the plaintiff, the wife 
of a deceased smoker, sought at a very early stage of the case to 
preclude, as a matter of law, the Correia defense, which Philip Mor­
ris, the manufacturer of the cigarettes smoked by the decedent, had 
asserted.499  The plaintiff was determined to achieve clarity on the 
unreasonable use defense before she engaged in the expensive dis­
covery and trial process.500  Her argument was simple: cigarettes 
are a unique product because they cause injury when used exactly 
as intended, therefore, it is illogical to think of the “unreasonable 
use” of cigarettes as the sole cause of a smoker’s injury, as contem­
plated by Correia.501  In order to sharpen the question into a pure 
issue of law, the plaintiff made stipulations to clear away issues of 
fact, such as admitting that the decedent was aware of the risks of 
smoking and acted unreasonably in smoking.502  The fact that the 
plaintiff was prepared to stipulate away virtually her entire case, in 
the event that the Correia defense was held to apply to cigarettes, 
shows that “unreasonable use” had become the main battleground 
upon which many Massachusetts products liability cases were 
decided. 
In coming to the question of whether it would recognize the 
“unreasonable use” of a product whose only safe use is nonuse, 
Haglund outlined the precepts of the implied warranty of 
merchantability.503  It was here that the conundrum of strict liability 
re-emerged, after Vassallo had seemingly broken with the nostrums 
of the past by discarding the hindsight test and liability without 
fault in warning cases.504 Haglund repeated the Strict Liability 
Maxim, the 402A Maxim, and the Product, Not Conduct Maxim, 
while insisting on the “distinct duties and standards of care” for 
are a necessary predicate for a post-sale duty to warn if the warning is merely to inform 
of the availability of product-safety improvement.”). 
499.	 Haglund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 2006). 
500.	 Id. at 321. 
501.	 Id. at 324. 
502.	 Id. at 321. 
503.	 Id. at 321-23. 
504.	 See supra Part III.A. 
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negligence and warranty liability.505  These incantations of strict lia­
bility were a break not only from Vassallo, which had implicitly rec­
ognized the similarity between negligence and warranty standards, 
but also the 2001 cases of Lewis v. Ariens Co.506 and Hoffman v. 
Houghton Chemical Corp.507  Lewis had stated that in Vassallo, 
Massachusetts “abandoned the strict liability approach to implied 
warranties of merchantability in favor of a ‘state of the art’ standard 
similar to [the one found] in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability § 2(c) (1998).”508 Hoffman acknowledged that 
the failure to warn under negligence and the failure to warn under 
warranty are governed by the same reasonableness standard, with 
the court recognizing the “convergence” of the two theories.509 
With Hoffman repeating the observation in Back that the inquiries 
under negligence and under warranty in a design case are “‘essen­
tially the same,’” a reader of Massachusetts products liability law 
would have justly concluded that the days of insisting that a strict 
liability facade cover a negligence framework were over.510 
Haglund repeated the strict liability rhetoric, even the parts from 
Correia about consumers being “entitled to the maximum of pro­
tection,” without so much as a nod to the “convergence” an­
nounced by the same court five years earlier in Lewis and 
Hoffman.511 
Haglund also maintained the adherence to section 402A found 
in the pre-Vassallo cases, while saying nothing of the new Restate­
ment, which had been endorsed in Vassallo, Lewis, and Hoff­
man.512  This fidelity to section 402A was curious in light of 
Haglund’s holding.  It held that in most instances, Correia would be 
inapplicable to cigarettes, except when it could be shown that the 
505. Haglund, 847 N.E.2d at 323 n.9 (quoting Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 
N.E.2d 1305, 1316 (Mass. 1988)). 
506. Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. 2001). 
507. Hoffman v. Houghton Chem. Corp., 751 N.E.2d 848 (Mass. 2001). 
508. Lewis, 751 N.E.2d at 865. 
509. Hoffman, 751 N.E.2d at 860 n.19 (quoting Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 
964, 970 (Mass. 1978)). 
510. Id. at 859 n.19.  “The Court will leave the task of distinguishing between 
negligence and strict liability in the duty to warn to those who count angels on the 
heads of pins.” Id. at 860 n.20 (quoting Nigh v. Dow Chem. Co., 634 F. Supp. 1513, 
1517 (W.D. Wis. 1986)). 
511. Haglund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 315, 322 (Mass. 2006) (quoting 
Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Mass. 1983)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
512. Hoffman, 751 N.E.2d at 859; Lewis, 751 N.E.2d at 866-67; Vassallo v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922-23 (Mass. 1998). 
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plaintiff had begun smoking at a time when he knew of a specific 
medical condition that would be exacerbated by cigarette use, i.e., 
an emphysema sufferer who begins smoking.513  The logic of strip­
ping away Correia was compelling for cigarettes. The “unreasona­
ble use” doctrine presumed that normal use was safe, but cigarettes 
are always dangerous.514 Correia was designed to encourage con­
sumers to use products more safely, but safer use could only mean 
not using the product, “which runs contrary to our entire scheme of 
commerce,” not to mention Philip Morris’ business model.515 
Haglund relied upon section 402A for the rationale that the cost of 
reasonably foreseeable injuries should be borne by those who place 
products on the market, but it omitted the fact that section 402A 
never envisioned liability flowing from the inherent dangers of ciga­
rettes.  Comment i to section 402A states that “[g]ood tobacco is 
not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking 
may be harmful.”516  By “good tobacco,” it meant unadulterated 
tobacco, distinguishing a tobacco product that contained some ma­
rijuana, which could make the product unreasonably dangerous.517 
Of course, section 402A’s treatment of tobacco is itself open to crit­
icism since attitudes toward tobacco and the knowledge of to­
bacco’s risks have grown greatly since 1965.518  But section 402A 
had long been seen as a dead end for cigarette plaintiffs.519  Philip 
Morris’ analogies to products like sugar and suntan oil, which also 
carry certain risks, were rejected as false by Haglund,520 but com­
ment i had credited those same kinds of analogies, including the 
one about sugar.521 
The preference for section 402A’s strict liability tenets seems 
to have been deliberate, since it would have provided a more open-
ended standard for judging the inherent risks of a product, and the 
513. Haglund, 847 N.E.2d at 326-27. 
514. Id. at 324. 
515. Id. at 325. 
516. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). 
517. See id. 
518. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (recognizing prisoner’s 
claim under Eighth Amendment of Constitution for exposure to secondhand smoke). 
519. See Paul G. Crist & John M. Majoras, The “New” Wave in Smoking and 
Health Litigation–Is Anything Really So New?, 54 TENN. L. REV. 551, 585 (1987) (not­
ing that comment i is often “the beginning and the end of [the] analysis” in cigarette 
suits). 
520. Haglund, 847 N.E.2d at 325. 
521. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i. 
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standard did not specifically exclude tobacco from liability.522  It is 
hard to see Haglund as anything but a retrograde opinion, meant to 
re-introduce the notion, if not the actuality, of strict liability into 
Massachusetts products liability law.523  As it did so, Haglund was 
reaffirming Correia itself, making clear that cigarettes were a spe­
cial case.  So Haglund may have opened the doors, at least theoreti­
cally, to broader cigarette liability, and it may provide ammunition 
for future litigants to argue for the adoption of non-fault-based 
standards, but product manufacturers and sellers won the broader 
victory by keeping in place a complete defense. Haglund might 
have taken the opportunity presented by a cigarette case to abolish 
Correia and account for the plaintiff’s negligent conduct, to the ex­
tent it existed, as part of the jury’s comparative fault decision.  It 
could have taken that step by admitting, as recent decisions of the 
Supreme Judicial Court had done, that the reasonableness of the 
manufacturer’s conduct is at issue in design and warning cases,524 
and therefore the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct can be 
weighed against it. Correia’s refusal to subject warranty claims to 
the comparative negligence regime was grounded in the belief that 
all product defect actions were based on strict liability, a miscon­
ception that Vassallo, Lewis, and Hoffman had apparently 
solved.525 Haglund allowed that misconception to continue. 
Haglund’s rhetorical triumph for strict liability and consumer pro­
tection carried with it a practical defeat for injured consumers. 
D. The Unresolved Place of the Reasonable Alternative Design 
Part II.C of this Article described how during the 1980s and 
1990s a reasonable alternative design became required in federal 
courts applying Massachusetts law, while the question of whether 
that element of proof was truly required in Massachusetts state 
courts remained unanswered.  That ambiguity has persisted in the 
decisions that have followed Vassallo.  Federal courts have contin­
ued to state with confidence, following the First Circuit’s 1990 deci­
522. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e (1998).  It would 
be fair to say, however, that the new Restatement does not create a receptive environ­
ment to a cigarette suit in that categorical liability is thought to be inappropriate for 
widely distributed products. Id. at cmt. d. 
523. Haglund seems to have been written as if Vassallo, Lewis, and Hoffman had 
not been decided. Haglund, 847 N.E.2d at 321-23. 
524. Back v. Wickes, 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978); Vassallo v. Baxter Health­
care Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922-23 (Mass. 1998). 
525. Hoffman v. Houghton Chem. Corp., 751 N.E.2d 848, 859 (Mass. 2001); Lewis 
v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862, 866-67 (Mass. 2001); Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d at 922-23. 
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sion in Kotler v. American Tobacco Co.,526 that the plaintiff must 
prove the existence of a safer alternative design in a design defect 
claim.527  In Gillespie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the plaintiff was in­
jured using a table saw.528  He put forward two theories as to why 
the saw was defectively designed.529  For each theory, an expert tes­
tified about other designs which the expert believed were safer.530 
Gillespie held that one of those theories was flawed and could not 
be the basis for recovery because the arguably better design would 
not have prevented the actual injury sustained by the plaintiff.531  In 
Gillespie, the reasonable alternative requirement was essential to 
the decision because the proof on that point was held to be insuffi­
cient, necessitating a new trial.532  Meanwhile, Massachusetts state 
courts have continued to hint at the importance of a safer alterna­
tive design, but they have not spoken with the clarity of federal 
courts. 
Haglund, unlike Kotler, was a cigarette case premised upon a 
safer alternative design.533  The plaintiff in Haglund argued that 
Philip Morris could have marketed a non-addictive cigarette with 
the nicotine removed.534  Although the issue on appeal pertained to 
the Correia defense, and not the viability of the plaintiff’s design 
defect theory, Haglund did say that “[t]he plaintiff need only con­
vince the jury that a safer alternative design was feasible, not that” 
it had been adopted by any manufacturer in the industry.535  This 
statement, as the court had done in previous decisions from the 
1980s, skirted the question of whether the alternative design is es­
sential, rather than just a sufficient basis for presenting a design 
claim to a jury.536  To the extent it can be argued that a reasonable 
alternative design requirement is implicit in the court’s discussion in 
Haglund, it does not seem to be a mistake that Massachusetts fed­
eral courts have spoken clearly on the subject, and state courts have 
526. Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated on other 
grounds, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), remanded to 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992). 
527. See Gillespie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 386 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2004); Public 
Serv. Mut. Ins. v. Empire Comfort Sys., Inc., 2008 WL 3884342, at *5 (D. Mass 2008). 
528. Gillespie, 386 F.3d at 24-25. 
529. Id. at 25. 
530. Id. at 26-28. 
531. Id. at 27. 
532. Id. at 31. 
533. Haglund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Mass. 2006). 
534. Id. 
535. Id. at 323. 
536. See supra Part II.C (discussion of previous decision avoiding question of 
whether reasonable alternative design is required). 
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not.537 Haglund also emphasized strict liability under the implied 
warranty of merchantability even for “properly designed” prod­
ucts,538 as did Colter, Correia, and Hayes during the 1980s.539  The 
reluctance to finally decide this issue suggests that Massachusetts 
courts are unwilling to tie themselves to a reasonable alternative 
design requirement.  After all, Haglund’s broad language condemn­
ing cigarettes as inherently unsafe may have signaled a willingness 
to impose liability where Kotler did not, that is, under a design de­
fect theory that the risks of cigarettes outweigh their utility. 
The impact of not explicitly requiring a reasonable alternative 
design is unlikely to lead to many products being condemned for 
inherent attributes that cannot be made any safer, like castor oil, 
whiskey, or butter, invoked by section 402A. The Restatement 
(Third) of Torts does allow for an exception to the reasonable alter­
native design requirement when the product has very low social 
utility and a high degree of danger.540  It has been rare for courts 
anywhere to make that judgment.541  Rather than making a frontal 
assault on the overall danger of a product, plaintiffs are more likely 
to make criticisms of certain design features, while wishing not to 
be held to the burden of showing how those features could be made 
better.  Expert testimony is ordinarily required to meet that bur­
den,542 and even with expert testimony, the supposedly better de­
sign can be attacked by defense counsel in the same way that the 
defendant’s original design was attacked.543  The alternative design 
might carry its own risks, and it might not, as was true in Gillespie, 
537. Haglund, 847 N.E.2d at 323; see Fidalgo v. Columbus McKinnon Corp., 775 
N.E.2d 803, 808-09 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).  In Fidalgo, the appeals court assumed that 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Colter and Uloth had required a safer alternative design. 
Id. at 808.  In characterizing those holdings, however, Fidalgo inserted the word 
“must,” a word that neither Colter or Uloth used. Id. Fidalgo held that a design claim 
was inadequate where the proposed alternative design was simply not feasible. Id. at 
808-09. 
538. Haglund, 847 N.E.2d at 323. 
539. See Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1313 (Mass. 1988) (cita­
tions omitted). 
540. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e (1998). 
541. See id. § 2 Reporters’ Note. 
542. See Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. v. Empire Comfort Sys. Inc., 573 F. Supp. 2d 372, 
380 (D. Mass. 2008); Goffredo v. Mercedes-Benz Truck Co., 520 N.E.2d 1315, 1318-19 
(Mass. 1988). 
543. See, e.g., Fidalgo v. Columbus McKinnon Corp., 775 N.E.2d 803, 806-09 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2002). 
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have prevented the harm suffered by the plaintiff.544  In Smith v. 
Ariens Co., the plaintiff was allowed to recover based on apparent 
deficiencies in a snowmobile’s design.545  The design feature that 
caused harm seemed unwise and was probably fixable, but the 
plaintiff did not have to show how exactly the snowmobile should 
have been designed.546  As it stands now under Massachusetts law, 
a reasonable alternative design is a recognized way of proving a 
design defect case, but it may not be the only way. 
IV. THE FUTURE AND A BETTER WAY FORWARD 
The modern era of Massachusetts products liability law has 
been plagued by the conundrum of strict liability.  It has led to doc­
trinal incoherence, wooden rules, and outcomes that do not benefit 
society.  Reasonable people can differ over policy objectives, but 
there should be no argument over the need for change when the 
law fails to effectuate widely shared goals.  Massachusetts products 
liability law should be changed in some specific ways, which this 
Article discusses, but more importantly, Massachusetts courts need 
a more logical framework for allocating burdens of proof, setting 
standards of conduct, and balancing competing interests. The Re­
statement (Third) of Torts provides a clear, functional approach to 
deciding products liability cases, and one which is fundamentally 
consistent with longstanding precedent.  With that approach in 
mind, this Article argues for the overdue rationalization of Massa­
chusetts products liability law. 
A. Agnosticism over Doctrinal Labels 
The new Restatement has attempted to avoid the pitfalls asso­
ciated with doctrinal categories.  The rules it states are functional, 
and so long as those functional requirements are met, it expresses 
no opinion on how the claims are denominated.547  While that dip­
lomatic approach has its virtues, this Article argues that “negli­
gence” and “strict liability” have acquired so much baggage, have 
meanings, which are so imprecise, and have caused so much mis­
chief.  It would be best, at a minimum, to refrain from using “strict 
liability” to describe the theory of products liability in Massachu­
544. Gillespie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 386 F.3d 21, 27-29 (1st Cir. 2004) (dis­
cussing contradictory evidence on whether alternative design would have prevented 
injury). 
545. Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 957-58 (Mass. 1978). 
546. Id. at 958-59. 
547. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n (1998). 
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setts.  The “strict liability” label has led Massachusetts courts to re­
peatedly claim that in design and warning cases, they are only 
looking at the product, and not the conduct of the defendant, as if 
the product could be shipped to a laboratory and the absence of a 
warning could be viewed under a microscope, in the way a manu­
facturing flaw could be.  In reality, design choices and the choices 
whether to give warnings involve a defendant’s conduct.  Ending 
the conundrum of strict liability would stop the perplexing practice 
of what one scholar has described as calling “a pig a mule.”548 
B. Acknowledging Fault and Non-Fault Based Standards 
Removing “strict liability” from the vocabulary does not mean 
that liability without fault does not exist in Massachusetts.  Indeed, 
liability without fault has an appropriate place in Massachusetts 
products liability law.  On the other hand, most of the important 
questions during the modern era have been resolved, and will con­
tinue to be resolved, under fault-based, reasonableness stan­
dards.549  This may not satisfy doctrinal purists, but a mixture of 
fault-based and non-fault-based rules will best advance social pol­
icy.  Under Massachusetts law and the new Restatement, a con­
sumer injured due to a manufacturing defect in a product need not 
prove the product manufacturer or seller was at fault.550  Similarly, 
inadvertent design error cases, in which the product manifestly fails 
to perform as intended, such as when an airplane’s wings fall off 
during normal operation, should allow for recovery without the 
plaintiff needing to prove that the manufacturer’s negligence led to 
a product defect.551  That defect can be inferred from the circum­
stances, and liability can follow without direct proof of fault.552  In 
addition, the liability of a product seller, such as a distributor or 
548. David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products Lia­
bility Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 749 (“Quite simply, most courts have been saying 
one thing while doing quite another—calling a pig a mule.”). 
549. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing risk-utility standard for design claims); supra 
Part III.A (discussing fault-based standard for duty to warn); supra Part III.B (discuss­
ing reasonableness standard for post-sale duty to warn). 
550. See Gleason v. Source Perrier, 553 N.E.2d 544 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (af­
firming liability in case of manufacturing defect in bottle); Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 
N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978) (noting straightforward application of liability without 
fault in case of manufacturing defect); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF  TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. 
§ 2(a). 
551. See Carey v. Gen. Motors Corp., 387 N.E.2d 583 (1979) (theory of design 
defect based on improper engineering practice upheld without showing of alternative 
design); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 3 cmt. b. 
552. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 3. 
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retailer who is not involved in the design or manufacture of the 
product, is vicarious in nature.553  The seller of a product that is 
defectively designed due to the design choices of the manufacturer 
may be held liable for that defect even though the seller did nothing 
negligent.554 
Fault-based standards have been dominant in Massachusetts 
products liability law, as they are in the new Restatement, and in 
other jurisdictions in the United States.555  As this Article has 
pointed out, the Back design defect factors are mostly a refinement 
of the Judge Learned Hand’s B<PL negligence formulation, and 
Massachusetts law has always judged a manufacturer’s design 
choices by nothing more than a rule of reason.556  A designer must 
only design against reasonably foreseeable risks.557  The duty to 
warn, at least since Vassallo, has extended only to risks that are 
known or should have been known to an expert in the field.558  The 
adequacy of warnings has always been governed by a reasonable­
ness standard.559  Massachusetts courts have permitted a product 
manufacturer to discharge his duty to warn through intermediaries, 
so long as the reliance upon the intermediary is reasonable.560  The 
post-sale duty to warn, whatever its limitations, has been extended 
no further than an obligation to act reasonably under the circum­
stances.561  These reasonableness standards are aimed at judging 
conduct, because “the goal of products liability law is to induce con­
duct that is capable of being performed.”562 
Where Massachusetts products liability law has gone off 
course, it has not been because these flexible fault-based standards 
have been found wanting.  Indeed, it was through application of 
negligence principles that the patent danger rule was eliminated in 
553. See id. § 2 cmt. o. 
554. See id. 
555. See id. § 2 Reporters’ Note (surveying fifty states and finding risk-utility 
standard dominant); Owen, supra note 548, at 785-88 (noting the “explosion” of the R 
myth of strict liability in design and warning cases). 
556. See supra Part I.D.4. 
557. Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (Mass. 1978). 
558. Vassallo v. Baxter, 696 N.E.2d 909, 923-24 (Mass. 1998); Lewis v. Ariens Co., 
751 N.E.2d 862, 865-66 (Mass. 2001) (re-affirming knew or should have known standard 
for duty to warn). 
559. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 71-72 (Mass. 
1985). 
560. See Hoffman v. Houghton Chem. Corp., 751 N.E.2d 848, 858-59 (Mass. 2001) 
(bulk supplier doctrine); MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 68-70. 
561. See supra Part III.B. 
562. Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d at 922-23. 
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Uloth and the intended use paradigm was abolished in developing 
crashworthiness standards in Smith and Back.563  When Massachu­
setts courts began to embrace the rigidity of the supposedly pro­
gressive strict liability standard, unjust and perplexing results began 
to appear due to wooden rules that appeared detached from any 
social policy justification.  When Correia introduced the “unreason­
able use” defense in the name of strict liability, the seemingly dead 
assumption of risk and patent danger rules were revived.564  In a 
stroke, the often complex issue of the plaintiff’s conduct toward the 
product became a yes or no question that often served as a com­
plete bar to recovery.565  As a result, negligence claims have often 
been a better vehicle for recovery.566  Warranty seems only to offer 
the unreasonable use defense while maintaining the same design 
and warning standards as negligence. 
C. Recognizing the Convergence and Clarifying the Muddle 
With the insight that in design and warning cases, negligence 
and warranty standards are essentially the same, it is clear that the 
inquiries made by courts and juries need to be simplified.  Asking 
finders of fact to make fine doctrinal distinctions that had no sub­
stance in reality was never wise.  As this Article has pointed out, 
these distinctions created the need to apply the overlapping analy­
ses of reasonably foreseeable misuse, unreasonable use, proximate 
cause, ordinary negligence, and comparative fault to the fact, for 
example, that a product user did not wear goggles.567  As the Re­
statement (Third) of Torts holds, factually identical design and 
warning claims should not be submitted to a jury under different 
doctrinal labels.568  The new Restatement warns, and experience in 
Massachusetts has shown, doing so would lead to confusion and in­
consistent verdicts.569  Similarly, with the insight that it is the rea­
sonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct at issue in design and 
563. See supra Parts I.D.2 and I.D.3; see also Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 
N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978); Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954 (Mass. 1978); Back v. 
Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964 (Mass. 1978). 
564. See supra Part II.A; see also Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 
N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. 1983). 
565. See supra Part II.A (discussing contours of unreasonable use defense). 
566. See supra Part II.A (discussing plaintiffs’ difficulty in recovering under war­
ranty claims); Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1307-08 (Mass. 1988) 
(plaintiff recovered on negligence claim but not on warranty claim). 
567. See supra notes 301-306 (discussing Allen II). 
568. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n (1998). 
569. See Correia, 446 N.E.2d 1033 (inconsistent jury instruction submitted by the 
court); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n. 
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warning cases, the comparative fault statute should be applied to 
judge the conduct of the plaintiff and to act as a complete or partial 
defense.  Applying a unitary standard and submitting a factual 
claim of warning or design defect just once to the jury will require 
the elimination of the Correia defense.  Once the fiction, that the 
defendant’s conduct is not at issue, is removed, the theoretical basis 
for Correia vanishes, and the plaintiff’s conduct can be judged 
under the comparative fault statute.  Besides, it would complicate, 
rather than simplify, matters to allow the unreasonable use defense 
to be layered on top of the comparative fault defense.570  Without 
Correia, the jury would be allowed to decide in a design case, where 
the plaintiff’s use of the product arguably diverged from the manu­
facturer’s intended use, whether the use was reasonably foresee­
able, whether the defect was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 
injury in light of the plaintiff’s use of the product, and whether the 
plaintiff’s conduct was negligent under the comparative fault stat­
ute.571  That would be a comprehensible and logical analysis. 
Clarifying the muddle will also require careful thought by 
courts in delineating affirmative defenses from elements of the 
plaintiff’s proof.  The two may look similar when the defendant is 
attempting to negate the plaintiff’s proof; the defendant’s attack 
may look like a defense.  Misuse should not be seen as an affirma­
tive defense, a mistake the First Circuit made in Cigna Insurance 
Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., where the error meant that the defendant 
had the burden of showing sufficient evidence to warrant a jury in­
struction on the issue.572  In fact, misuse is not a distinct concept;573 
the question simply is whether the use was reasonably foreseeable 
or not.574 
D.	 Getting Rid of Wooden Rules and Making Wise Policy 
Choices 
This Article has argued that the distinction between the post-
sale duty to warn of risks and the post-sale duty to warn of risk 
570.	 See generally, Correia, 446 N.E.2d 1033. 
571. As this Article has previously argued, the foreseeability analysis usually in­
volved in proximate cause should drop out in a case involving a manufacturer’s failure 
to include a safety device in the design of a product, as it overlaps with the antecedent 
duty question, which also hinges on reasonable foreseeability. See supra Part II.A (cit­
ing Twerski, supra note 280). 
572.	 Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001). 
573.	 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. p. 
574. See Allen v. Chance Mfg. Co., 494 N.E.2d 1324, 1326-27 (Mass. 1986) (hold­
ing that a plaintiff must prove the use (or alleged misuse) was reasonably foreseeable). 
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avoidance measures is arbitrary and has never been justified.575 
This is a wooden rule that can be rectified by doing nothing more 
than requiring the manufacturer or seller to act with reasonable 
care under the circumstances.  The touchstone of duty in a post-sale 
failure to warn case is the economic and practical feasibility of giv­
ing a warning to the user.576  Once that feasibility is established, 
which is no easy matter,577 and the risk to the user is non-negligible, 
there is no good reason to withhold notice of a product’s risks, or to 
withhold notice of a design improvement that would reduce risk. 
The implied warranty of merchantability, despite its alleged 
congruence with strict liability in tort, contains a technical limita­
tion that appears to have no basis in public policy, if it is indeed 
true that the implied warranty of merchantability imposes duties by 
the operation of law rather than by contract.578  It has been held 
that there is no implied warranty made unless there has been a sale 
or a lease.579  As a result, a person who test-drove a vehicle from an 
automobile dealership did not enjoy the protection of the implied 
warranty of merchantability.580  The distinction between the driver 
who test-drives a vehicle, and the driver who drives that same vehi­
cle out of the lot after purchasing it, is akin to the old privity rule in 
that it erects an artificial barrier to recovery unconnected to any 
policy objective.  While it appears that only the legislature can rem­
edy this deficiency,581 it should do so, as this rule undermines the 
policy of broad consumer protection. 
This Article has pointed out that the place of the reasonable 
alternative design requirement remains an open question in Massa­
chusetts state courts.582  This ambiguity serves no constructive pur­
pose.  If, as has been hinted, proof of a reasonable alternative 
design is required, litigants ought to know because the expense of 
providing the proof can be considerable.583  If there is some cate­
575. See supra Part III.B. 
576. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 10(b) (illustrating that 
three of four factors involve burden and feasibility of giving post-sale warning). 
577. See, e.g., Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862, 867 (Mass. 2001) (stating that 
it is not feasible to warn second hand purchaser of snow blower). 
578. See Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (Mass. 1978) (holding that a 
duty under implied warranty of merchantability is imposed by law as a matter of social 
policy, not by contract). 
579. Mason v. General Motors Corp., 490 N.E.2d 437, 441-42 (Mass. 1986). 
580. See id. 
581. See id. 
582. See supra Parts I.D.1, II.C, and III.D. 
583. See Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. v. Empire Comfort Sys., Inc., 573 F. Supp. 2d 372, 
380 (D. Mass. 2008) (stating expert testimony almost always required). 
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gory of cases where the alternative design requirement does not ap­
ply, then that category should be carefully defined.  In a case 
assailing the conscious design choices of the manufacturer, the Re­
statement (Third) of Torts requires a practical, feasible, safer alter­
native design in order to show a design defect.584  There is an 
exception for manifestly unreasonable designs that involve gratui­
tous risk and virtually no social value.585  This balance honors con­
sumer choice in that widely distributed products, like above-ground 
swimming pools, cannot be condemned on a categorical basis.586 
Where the plaintiff takes issue with particular design features of the 
product, by suggesting that the features should not exist or should 
be different, a reasonableness standard quickly generates questions 
about how removing or changing the contested design features 
would impact the cost, usefulness or attractiveness of the product, 
or how it would create other risks.587  Without an alternative design 
as a point of comparison, juries will be asked to engage in rootless 
reasonableness inquiries of relative risk.  They would be placed in 
the position of attempting to re-conceive the design process, evalu­
ating the tradeoffs between functionality, cost, and safety that the 
original designer made, but without all of the information or the 
expertise possessed by the original designer.  Evaluating conscious 
design choices in reference to a proposed alternative design makes 
an already difficult task manageable.  In short, plaintiffs need to be 
put to the burden of proving a technically feasible, reasonable alter­
native design that would have prevented the injury suffered, as win­
ning plaintiffs have generally done in Massachusetts.588 
CONCLUSION 
The longstanding attachment to section 402A of the Restate­
ment (Second) of Torts, and to the rhetoric of strict liability, shown 
by Massachusetts courts during the modern era of products liability 
law ceased, some time ago, to serve the interests of the adjudicatory 
process or the interests of consumers or of product sellers.  Experi­
584. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998). 
585. See id. § 2 cmt. e. 
586. See id. § 2 cmt. d. 
587. See generally Conscious Design Choices, supra note 192, at 1552-58. R 
588. See, e.g., Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1191 (Mass. 1978) 
(plaintiff’s verdict on negligent design affirmed where there was evidence of several 
design changes that could have made product safer); Richard v. Amer., Mfg. Co., 489 
N.E.2d 214 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (plaintiff’s verdict on negligent design upheld where 
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ence has shown that completing the rationalization of Massachu­
setts products liability law will require putting aside old nostrums; 
the mischief caused by imprecise language and incoherent doctrine 
is simply too great.  Some forty-five years after its promulgation, 
section 402A has run its course, and it is time to adopt explicitly the 
standards found in the Restatement (Third) of Torts. The new Re­
statement’s functional rules represent wise policy, and provide 
needed clarity to questions that section 402A did not attempt to 
answer.  Breaking with past tenets can be difficult in a common law 
system that respects precedent, but Massachusetts courts have been 
able to make a clean break with products liability rules that no 
longer work. When Carter v. Yardley & Co. abolished the privity 
rule in negligence actions in 1946, the Supreme Judicial Court was 
blunt: “In principle it was unsound.  It tended to produce unjust 
results. It has been abandoned by the great weight of authority else­
where. We now abandon it in this Commonwealth.”589  Notions of 
strict liability in design and warning cases are rightly subject to a 
similar indictment and deserve a similar fate. 
589. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (Mass. 1946). 
